

JPRS-TAC-91-007

22 MARCH 1991



JPRS Report

Arms Control

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ANGOLA

MPLA Reportedly Using Chemical Weapons in Uige

MB0803210891 (Clandestine) KUP in English to Southern and Central Africa 1910 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Text] Jamba, Friday, March 8—The MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government is reported to be using chemical weapons against the rural population in a move believed to be a retaliation against people suspected to be UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] supporters.

Informed KUP sources said today that Qilemba village, situated 65 kms north of Uige was attacked by MPLA MiG jet fighters causing heavy casualties among the population and destroying homes and property early this week.

Explosions followed by a thick green smoke was seen by survivors who added that three days later, they discovered all [words indistinct] were found near the village, according to the sources. MPLA forces have been using chemical weapons against UNITA forces and the civilian people, including water poisoning.

CHINA**Soviet Troops To Leave Mongolia by 1992**

*OW103132791 Beijing XINHUA in English
1227 GMT 1 Mar 91*

[Text] Moscow, March 1 (XINHUA)—A senior officer of the Soviet Defense Ministry announced today that the Soviet Union will complete its troops withdrawal from Mongolia by 1992 and from Czechoslovakia and Hungary before June 30 this year.

General German Burutin told official TASS news agency that between 1987 and 1991, the Soviet Union has withdrawn from Eastern European nations and Mongolia 223,000 troops, 8,000 tanks, some 4,000 pieces of artillery and over 760 fighters.

Burutin said that Moscow has pulled out 85 percent of its troops and 90 percent of its technical weaponry from Czechoslovakia and 80 percent of its troops and 85 percent of its technical weaponry from Hungary.

Under the Soviet-German accord, the general said, his country has started pulling its troops out of Germany and the pullout plan for the first two months of this year has been completed, with 16,000 troops, 500 tanks, and 230 pieces of artillery already withdrawn.

He also said that the speed of troops withdrawal from Germany will be affected by the increase in transit fees on the Polish side.

PRC Joins Treaty Banning Seabed Nuclear Weapons**Government Issues Statement**

*OW1031303691 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0820 GMT 2 Mar 91*

[Text] Beijing, 2 March (XINHUA)—The Chinese Embassies in the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union on 28 February submitted a statement to the governments of these three countries, declaring that China has joined the "Treaty Banning the Installation of Nuclear and Other Mass Destructive Weapons on the Seabed and Its Subsoil."

The treaty, signed in 1971, became effective in 1972. The core of the treaty is that all signatories undertake the obligation not to install "any nuclear or other kinds of mass destructive weapons, and structures, launching facilities, or any other equipment exclusively for storing, experimenting, and using such weapons" on the seabed and in its subsoil of the high seas. The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union are the nations which possess copies of the treaty.

China has consistently advocated a comprehensive ban and total elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The goal, contents, and enforcement of the treaty show that it can exert a positive influence on averting the installation and deployment of nuclear weapons on the seabed and in its subsoil.

In the statement on joining the treaty, the Chinese Government declares: Any stipulation in the treaty should not be interpreted as an infringement upon the PRC's sovereignty and other rights in its territorial waters and the waters, seabed, and subsoil bordering its territorial waters; the Taiwan authorities' unlawful use of the name of China in signing and ratifying the treaty in 1971 and 1972 is null and void.

Deposits Accession Document With USSR

*PM1103124191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4*

[Unattributed report: "Deposited"]

[Text] PRC Ambassador to the USSR Yu Hongliang has deposited with the USSR Government a document on the PRC's accession to the 11 February 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

The aforementioned document was accepted on behalf of the USSR Government by I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs.

Potential for Asia-Pacific Confidence-Building Measures Viewed

*OW1003134191 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
No 9, 4-10 Mar 91 pp 10-12*

[Article by Si Chu: "Confidence-Building in Asia-Pacific"]

[Text] In view of the rapidly changing world today and particularly the tragic events in the Gulf, confidence-building measures (CBMs) and other security issues in the Asia-Pacific region have become more prominent. Against this background, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific organized a regional meeting on "Confidence-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region" in Kathmandu, Nepal, from January 24 to 26, 1991. Thirty-one government officials, diplomats, scholars, and the people from the non-government organizations and the press, coming from China, the USSR, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Nepal, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Laos, Brunei, Austria, Germany and other countries participated in the meeting.

This meeting provided the participants with ample opportunity to exchange ideas and enhance mutual understanding on important issues.

World Situation

As one of the big countries in the Asia-Pacific region, China attaches great importance to maintaining and promoting peace, security and development of this

region. In this context, appropriate approach and suitable measures related to regional confidence-building, security and disarmament issues have been explored.

In such wide areas as Asia and the Pacific, regional confidence-building, security and disarmament issues cannot exist alone; on the contrary, they are closely linked to and affected by what is happening globally or in other areas. As long as the strong and big nations continue to bully the small and weak, the sovereignty of states continues to be trampled on, and the arms race continues to escalate, peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as elsewhere in the world will always be under threat; and as a result, confidence-building, security and disarmament arrangements for the Asia-Pacific area can hardly register real progress.

In recent years, there have occurred the most fundamental changes in the international arena since World War II. The old world order has broken up and the new order has not yet taken clear form. Today's overall international environment and atmosphere have improved to a certain degree, as shown by the reduction in East-West military confrontation as well as by the fact that certain regional conflicts are on the verge of reaching political solutions. This indeed provides a favourable background for discussions on the confidence-building, security and disarmament issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

On the other hand, however, it is also undeniable that the world today continues to suffer from a series of factors which menace peace and security. Hegemony and power politics have yet to be eliminated. In certain areas, political, economic or national disputes are tending to deepen and worsen, leading to new tension and turbulence. Several regional conflicts, including, *inter alia*, that of the Middle East, have a long way to go and have many difficulties to overcome before reaching their just and reasonable political solution. In the field of disarmament, although its momentum has been somewhat abated, the global arms race has not yet come to an end. Worse still, in some cases, weapons claimed to be reduced have in fact been transferred to other areas, thus causing new problems for peace and security. The progress of multilateral disarmament efforts remains unsatisfactory, partly because of attempts to shift the responsibility for disarmament. In the economic field, increase of world trade has slowed, while the economic situation in the developing countries is getting bleaker, the disparity between developing and developed countries deeper and the North-South gap wider.

These grave factors not only affect world peace and security, but also confine and curb the emergence and development of regional confidence-building, security and disarmament measures. In this regard, the Asia-Pacific region is no exception.

Differences

Solutions to issues in Asia and the Pacific can only be found in light of the specific situation and characteristics of the region. This also holds true for the arrangements for CBMs, security and disarmament.

An idea has surfaced recently that the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe) model for confidence and security-building measures and the CFE (conventional forces of Europe) model for disarmament are panaceas that other parts of the world should only copy to solve their own problems. This, however, is not feasible.

Positive as it may be, the progress in Europe has been achieved under the circumstances prevalent in Europe. Experience gained in Europe can hardly apply to other regions where situations and conditions differ from those of Europe. Differences exist at least in the following aspects: (1) For many years, Europe was dominated by two clearly-delineated blocs that confronted each other both politically and militarily. No such blocs exist among the dozens of countries in Asia and the Pacific. (2) The Asia-Pacific region also differs from Europe in that there exists a wide variety of contradictions and problems of different sources and nature in this region, and indeed, in every sub-region. (3) Countries in Europe may be at different levels of development, but on the whole, all of them are developed countries; while in Asia and the Pacific there are developed countries, developing countries and even the least developed countries. (4) The political, social and cultural diversity among Asia and Pacific countries is also much greater than that existing in Europe. These major differences preclude any possibility of mechanically copying the European experience and model in this region.

Different regions can only find and adopt appropriate measures to solve their problems in light of their own specific circumstances. This is a basic principle, a principle that must be followed in making arrangements for confidence-building, security and disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

General Approach

Given the situation in our region, the following general approach appears to be reasonable and practicable in the search for confidence-building, security and disarmament arrangements:

(1) In terms of geographical scope, bilateral arrangements should be given priority, followed by multilateral arrangements in small regions, which can then be gradually expanded to encompass larger areas if necessary.

(2) In terms of the measures to be taken, CBMs should take precedence, to be developed into security arrangements and, at a later stage, appropriate arrangements for disarmament could be made.

(3) In terms of the nature of the contacts and meetings between different countries, emphasis should first be laid on

scholarly discussions and low-level official contacts, which will prepare the ground for high-level meetings.

(4) In terms of time, the institution of CBMs and security mechanism should be viewed as a process of continuous accumulation and gradual evolution, which needs time and patience.

This is only a general approach, which does not preclude the adoption of other methods and the occurrence of exceptional cases, so long as objective conditions and needs exist. However, viewed in the perspective of the overall process and steps to be taken, the above-mentioned approach is close to the logical development of things.

In light of this general approach, it is appropriate to first explore realistic and practicable CBMs. Generally speaking, CBMs can be divided into two categories: military and non-military, which are mutually complementary and promote each other. Given the situation in Asia and the Pacific, it seems that the first step should be taken in the non-military field, which will prepare the ground for the establishment of CBMs. The following steps are undoubtedly applicable to the Asia-Pacific region:

- Political and diplomatic relations between countries should be established and developed on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and peaceful coexistence;
- Economic relations between countries should be established and developed on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit;
- The search for fair and reasonable political solutions to the existing regional hot spots must be expedited;
- Aggression against and occupation of other countries must be stopped, interference in the internal affairs of other countries checked, and all forms of external expansion and hegemony opposed;
- International disputes must be settled by peaceful means, i.e. through negotiation and consultation;
- No country should seek to impose its social system and ideology upon other countries, nor should any country interfere in other countries' internal affairs or violate their sovereignty under such pretexts;
- Personnel exchanges and information interflow in the political, economic, social and cultural fields should be promoted among all countries, especially among those whose relations with each other are tense.

With regards to military or sub-military CBMs, the following are clearly relevant to the Asia-Pacific region:

1. Nuclear-weapon states should decide not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states;

2. In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, countries concerned may set up nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace, and such status should be respected by nuclear states;

3. Military bases, troops and military equipment, especially nuclear weapons set up or stationed on the territories of other countries must be dismantled or withdrawn; no country in the Asia and Pacific region should send military forces overseas;

4. Military equipment retired as a result of disarmament in other parts of the world should be destroyed. They should not be transferred to Asia and the Pacific, since such transfers will only constitute new factors of instability in this region;

5. Every country should exercise self-restraint in terms of armaments and military spending and not seek a level of armaments higher than that of necessary defensive needs. They should also take measures to make their military strategy and the structure of their armed forces strictly defensive;

6. In regions where conditions are ripe, countries concerned could, through consultations on a voluntary basis, make arrangements for the exchange and verification of military information and statistics and the declaration and mutual inspection of military manoeuvres, etc.

These are only some major aspects described in broad terms and do not exclude other CBMs.

It must be pointed out that the United States and the Soviet Union still maintain huge offensive armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, including ground and air forces and fleets, posing a grave threat to other countries and exerting a negative influence on the political security situation in this region. In discussing the security of Asia and the Pacific, this cannot but be taken as a priority issue.

Steady Progress

Recently, some views and suggestions have been put forward by various countries on the security of Asia and the Pacific. Still at a rather preliminary stage, these ideas have yet to be further developed and clarified. China is willing to positively consider all proposals and suggestions that are conducive to the improvement of security and maintenance of peace in the Asia-Pacific region, and will assess all the related ideas advanced by any side in light of the basic principles mentioned above.

Generally speaking, it would be too hasty to try to establish an Asia-Pacific security mechanism on a large scale overnight. Instead, what should be done is to let things take their own course, pushing gently here and there as appropriate and necessary. The more urgent tasks facing the Asia-Pacific region today are: resolving hot-spot issues and bilateral

disputes; strengthening economic co-operation. Countries concerned should first strengthen their dialogues and consultations, and take practical measures to enhance trust, reduce tensions, put an end to conflicts and strengthen security. On this basis, they can gradually establish and develop regional security mechanisms, first in small areas, and then step by step and if circumstances so require, extend them to larger regions. This will prove to be a suitable

approach for the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, issues concerning the common interest of all the countries in this region should be solved through consultation among all countries on an equal footing. If most countries tend to favour a certain form of consultation, this certainly deserves serious and positive consideration. Following these principles and approaches, the Asia-Pacific countries can surely find a suitable way to solve their problems.

JAPAN**Aid-for-Arms Control Proposal "Strategic Dud"**

OII 0603113591 Tokyo KYODO in English 1042 GMT
6 Mar 91

[By Jocelyn Ford]

[Text] Tokyo, March 6 (KYODO)—Japan's homegrown plan to thwart the possible emergence of another Saddam Husayn by linking its economic assistance to limits on military spending and arms exports is a nice idea but a strategic dud, say aid officials and analysts.

The plan is certain to appeal to Japanese taxpayers, many of whom in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf crisis have sought to reaffirm Japan's war-renouncing Constitution and the government's ban on weapons exports, say political analysts.

But the novel aid-for-arms-control strategy would be at best difficult to implement, and if unilaterally imposed could interfere with the balance of power in some regions while impeding attempts to promote stability through economic development, aid officials say.

Moreover, the policy could antagonize Japan's relations with some of its most important diplomatic partners, notably China, the No. 4 arms exporter to the developing world, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

The concept of using development aid to disarm potential Third World aggressors surfaced last week as lawmakers began to reflect on Japan's responsibility for the conflict in the Gulf as Iraq's largest aid donor.

In 1987 Japan accounted for 89 percent of Iraq's total 79 million dollars in aid receipts. Meanwhile, Baghdad was devoting nearly a quarter of its gross domestic product (GDP) to military expenditures in 1988, according to estimates by the authoritative International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). GDP measures the economy's total output of goods and services, minus foreign income.

So far Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have endorsed the suggestion that Tokyo investigate ways to curb official development assistance (ODA) to nations that export arms or spend excessive amounts on defense vis-a-vis GDP.

The plan would also further the government's goal of introducing clearer guidelines for Japan's burgeoning aid disbursements, which though the largest in the world are often criticized for lacking in aims.

"This could be a major development in fleshing out ODA principles, but it will have to be managed so that it doesn't cause international friction," said a member of the LDP Secretariat in charge of foreign policy.

So far, the proposals have been given a cool reception by aid bureaucrats, who say there are no viable criteria for assessing appropriate levels of defense for a nation, and the plan would trigger accusations of meddling in domestic affairs.

Besides, says an official involved with Japan's foreign aid program, such a plan could considerably decrease the volume of Japanese aid, Japan's most potent foreign policy tool.

Japan is a big lender to some big arms spenders. Among the top 10 recipients of Japanese aid four spend more than 4 percent of GDP on the military—Pakistan (6.7 percent), Egypt (6.2 percent), Sri Lanka (5.6 percent), and Thailand (4.4 percent), according to IISS estimates. Third World arms exporters who receive substantial economic aid include Brazil, Egypt, and China, the second largest beneficiary of Japanese ODA.

"My personal opinion is that this policy should be applied on a case-by-case basis with a high degree of flexibility," says the aid official, who requested anonymity. "When it comes to promoting peace, economic development is much more important than expenditures on the military."

The plan could be effective if pursued in tandem with international arms control efforts, but would be counterproductive if pursued unilaterally, several aid experts concurred.

"In Asia there is no mechanism for arms control. It is unrealistic to promote disarmament by ODA without first promoting comprehensive arms control," said a Foreign Ministry official in charge of economic cooperation.

Japan so far has shied away from proposals to hold multilateral talks on regional security, saying bilateral issues such as Japan's territorial dispute with the Soviet Union, and the Cambodian conflict should be solved first.

Developing countries are certain to call foul play if they are asked to curb weapons exports while those by major industrialized countries remain unfettered.

If the ODA-arms link is successfully forged into a viable policy, however, it would represent a departure from Japan's usual complacency of leaving international security concerns to other nations. Equally important, it would mark a distinctly Japanese contribution to international efforts to create a more secure world order in the post-cold war period, and one that is based on Japan's own experience.

Japan's economic success has been attributed in part to the country's security pact with the United States, which allowed Japan to pursue economic development without diverting excessive resources to defense. Defense expenditures hover around 1 percent of Japan's gross national product (GNP), among the lowest in terms of GNP among industrialized countries.

The success story, however, has inspired few followers in the developing world, says Nobuo Maruyama of the Institute of Developing Economies, a semigovernmental think tank.

Many developing countries regard military expenditure as a first step toward economic development, says Maruyama, a senior research officer of the institute's economic cooperation division.

"As long as (foreign governments) request ODA, we have a right to ask them to harmonize with our basic principles," Maruyama says. "This is a good opportunity to change their mentality."

NORTH KOREA

Papers Mark Anniversary of Bikini H-Bomb Test

*SK070314791 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1052 GMT 1 Mar 91*

["Lessons of Bikini"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, March 1 (KCNA)—Bikini Island where a hydrogen bomb explosion test took place on March 1, 1954 remains a voucher proving that the U.S. imperialists are the nuclear maniacs who try to exert nuclear holocaust on mankind, say papers here today.

Recalling that tens of Japanese fishermen were killed by the H-bomb explosion test of the U.S. imperialists, a signed article of NODONG SINMUN notes that disaster of Bikini exposed the crimes of the U.S. imperialists to the world and left lessons that the U.S. imperialists who attempt to bring back clouds of a nuclear war to hang over the heads of mankind should be condemned and vigilance be heightened.

The article goes on:

The U. S. imperialists are still stepping up the development and production of nuclear weapons, pursuing nuclear ambition.

It is on the Korean Peninsula that the U.S. imperialists are viciously activating nuclear war manoeuvres.

The U.S. imperialists are staging the "Team Spirit 91" joint military exercises, a test nuclear war and preliminary war against the northern half of our Republic, leading the situation of the Korean Peninsula to the brink of a nuclear war.

There is no guarantee that the adventurous "Team Spirit 91" war exercises will not turn into an actual war

A world free from nuclear weapons and nuclear war, a peaceful world can be built only by the united efforts of the world's peace-loving people.

When they firmly unite to smash the war manoeuvres of the U.S. imperialists and conduct a vigorous movement for a nuclear-free, peace zone, mankind will be relieved of the danger of a nuclear war.

An article of MINJU CHOSON says that the reckless nuclear war manoeuvres of the U.S. imperialists must be thwarted and the disaster of Bikini never be repeated.

SOUTH KOREA

Ship Said To Carry DPRK-Made Scuds to Syria

*SK070314591 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network
in Korean 1200 GMT 6 Mar 91*

[Text] CORRIERE DELLA SERA, an Italian newspaper, reported today that a Syrian-registered cargo ship loaded with North Korean-made Scud missiles is sailing to Syria after leaving North Korea.

The newspaper, quoting Lebanese sources, reported that these missiles, manufactured at Syrian request, have a range of 600 kilometers and can be loaded with biological and chemical weapons.

TAIWAN

Development of Chemical Weapons Denied

*OW1103154191 Taipei CNA in English 1524 GMT
11 Mar 91*

[Text] Taipei, March 11 (CNA)—The Republic of China has never developed or possessed any chemical weapons, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense said Monday.

The Republic of China has honored its obligations as a signatory to the Geneva Convention which bans the proliferation of chemical weapons, the spokesman said.

He made the statement when asked to comment on a NEW YORK TIMES report that the Republic of China was one of 14 developing nations believed to possess chemical weapons.

Citing a US Navy intelligence report, the TIMES gave the 14 as Burma, Communist China, India, North Korea, Syria, Vietnam, Israel, Egypt, South Korea, the Republic of China on Taiwan, Pakistan, Libya, Iran and Iraq.

Since communist China possesses a strong chemical warfare capability, the spokesman said, the Republic of China must strengthen its military preparedness against chemical attacks in order to secure its security.

He stressed, however, "We have never developed or possessed any chemical weapons."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA**Soviet Troops To Leave by 30 June**

[DPA20303579] Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1400 GMT 1 Mar 91]

[Text] The departure of the Central Group of Soviet Forces from Czechoslovakia and the Southern Group of Forces of Hungary will be carried out by 30 June 1991. This is stated by Lieutenant General German Burulin, first deputy chief of a main administration of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff. According to him, between 1987 and 1991, 223,000 Soviet soldiers have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe and Mongolia.

POLAND**Soviet Commander Assailed for 'Arrogant Behavior'**

[DZ280217079] Belgrade T-4/NJU/G in English 1325 GMT 28 Feb 91]

[Text] Warsaw February 28 (TANJUG)—There is a legal possibility for the commander of the Soviet forces in Poland, Gen. Viktor Dubinin be declared persona non grata because of his "arrogant behavior toward Polish authorities," Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski stated on Thursday.

The Soviet general recently accused Poland of "aspiring to represent the Soviet troops as an occupying force, as international offenders and proposed that they be transported from Poland as war prisoners - in closed and sealed Polish freight cars."

The Polish foreign minister described the accusations against Poland that it wished the profit from the transit of Polish troops from Germany, as persistently set out by the Soviet Union, as ignorance and/or ill will. He explained that the planned transport of 11,000 trains and 3,000 columns with 200 vehicles would cause huge material damage to the roads.

The efforts to have the Soviet troops withdrawn from Poland as soon as possible have so far met with no effect. The text of the agreement has been completed, but the deadline as proposed by the Soviet Union—mid-1994—was unacceptable. Warsaw demands that the withdrawal be carried out by the end of this year. Skubiszewski said.

Prime Minister: Soviet Transit Will Not Be Blocked

[DPA70315239] Hamburg DP-4 in German 1456 GMT 7 Mar 91]

[Excerpt] Warsaw (DPA)—Polish Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki reaffirmed today that Poland does not intend to block the transit of Soviet troops from Germany. The officials he met with in Bonn also see it this

way, he told journalists in Warsaw. Poland is flexible and also expects flexibility from the Soviet side.

In reply to questions from DPA, Polish Foreign Minister Spokesman Wladyslaw Kaczynski gave the assurance that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland will take place "before the peak of the transit from Germany." The agreements on the transit and withdrawal being sought with the Soviet Union are two different agreements. In this respect, there is no formal package. "However, in the interests of the matter, they should be concluded at the same time."

Poland has never intended blocking the transit. Because the size of the transit requires a contractual settlement, Poland prepared a draft treaty last year. The negotiations will continue in Moscow in the middle of the month [passage omitted].

Negotiator on 'Difficult' Soviet Troop Pullout Talks

[RZ/20313129] Warsaw RZ/1/ZPOSPOLITA/9/Polish 8 Mar 91 m/17

[Interview with Jan Parys, head of group negotiating the economic aspects of the Soviet Army transit through Poland, by Marek Majek, place and date not given. "We Are Not Out To Make a Quick Profit"]

[Text] [Majek] Lately, some in the ERG and the Soviet Union have been accusing the Polish side of dragging out negotiations on the transit of Soviet Army troops through Polish territory. What do you say?

[Parys] Right at the outset, I would like to say that the two parties, namely, Germany and the Soviet Union, agreed between themselves on the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in the former GDR. Neither side bothered to notify Poland, although it was absolutely clear that any such arrangement would of necessity have to involve Poland. This was a major omission on their part. Poland is not dragging out negotiations, but is negotiating the specific terms the troop transit will be subject to. There are countless details to be finalized, details that the other two parties have simply chosen to ignore or have neglected. Poland has the right to require, for example, that the transit take place according to the rules of the Polish highway code, that the vehicles used are fully insured, that the routes are agreed and clearly marked, that convoys are numbered, that the total number of vehicles in convoys is agreed—in a nutshell, there are numerous technical details. Over 10,000 trains and several hundred thousand heavy trucks will be involved. It cannot be a haphazard affair. Our position in this matter is well known and is favorable. Contrary to what the foreign press has been saying, we shall charge the normal applicable international charges for this transit. Our position on this is firm.

[Majek] What is the estimate of costs?

[Parrys] This will depend on the number of transports that pass through Poland. In the last round of negotiations held on 12-13 February 1991 in Warsaw, the Soviet team could not give us any figures because no rail freight agreement had yet been signed. Now that round is behind us, and it is known that approximately 85 percent of the transit will take place by rail. The Soviet generals should now be in a position to calculate their costs and their requirements. We know that the Soviet side will have difficulties with payment, and we anticipate that installments will be delayed. This could impact on the transit timetable. In turn, this could lead to political tension between the FRG and Poland. We would like to avoid this, and we have suggested that payment clauses from the agreement signed between Poland and the USSR should be removed and included in a collateral agreement signed by all three parties. We would like the German Government—which has committed itself to paying the transit costs up to the Polish-Soviet border—to nominate one of the German banks to service the costs of the operation. Poland could then present monthly bills for the number of actual transports for that month, and, after endorsement by the appropriate Soviet authorities, the bill could then be forwarded to the German bank handling the matter.

[Majle] What was the German and Soviet reaction to this proposal?

[Parrys] We had already been talking informally on this point with the Germans, and their initial reaction was favorable. The Germans want no hitches, and on this point we have an identical position. The Soviet side does not know about the proposal yet. These are our latest moves. Our first suggestion was that the Soviet Union should deposit a down-payment guarantee of \$500 million with us to cover costs, but this proved to be unrealistic.

[Majle] Your second sphere of involvement is the negotiation of terms of the stationing and subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops currently in Poland. The positions of the two sides on this issue seem to be very divergent.

[Parrys] These are proving to be difficult negotiations. They are made more difficult by the deterioration of the political climate in the USSR. We are still not convinced that the Soviet side has the political will to want a quick resolution of this matter. The whole matter is complicated by conflicting interest groups and people. An example would be the aggressive comments of General Dubynin, Commander of the Soviet Army Northern Group. Various groups in Moscow see the issue of withdrawal as a political tool they can use in the political game. At present, the situation is as follows: We are negotiating on three levels; namely, there are the political, the economic, and the legal working groups. For the Soviet side, the most important at the moment is the economic group.

We are concentrating on the following matters: Polish property that has been used by the Soviet troops, that is to say, everything they rented from us. This comes to over 3,000 buildings and other facilities. These buildings are now old and in a poor state of repair. We have to calculate how much it will cost to repair them. The 1956 Polish-USSR agreement on the temporary stationing of Soviet troops in Poland stipulates that these buildings must be handed back to the Polish side in good condition. We have to estimate the extent of damage and the cost of repair. These costs have to be met by the Soviet Union. Another aspect concerns the buildings that were constructed by the Soviet side. According to the treaty, we only need to take these buildings over where we think they would be useful to us. In such cases we shall have to calculate their value and these sums will be included in the total equation. Those buildings that we decline to take over must be dismantled at Soviet expense and the surrounding area restored to its original state. Any salvage materials from this operation belong to the Soviet side. Another matter is to secure periodic payments due from the Soviet side for the period beginning 1 January 1991 for transport services rendered and their use of our forestry and agriculture. These are payments that have not been paid before. We must also negotiate the loss to Poland for the non-use of agricultural and forestry land that has been out of normal commercial circulation for the last 40 years. We intend to secure full compensation.

[Majle] Has there been any shift in the Soviet position recently?

[Parrys] Initially, the Soviet Union showed no great desire to fix a date for the withdrawal of its forces. If this became inevitable, they first wanted to sell off all the buildings they had constructed. They were even thinking of selling to foreign companies. This was quite unacceptable to us. We tried to explain to the Soviet side that such agreements would be void under Polish law, because in Poland an object erected on land belongs to the land-owner. Regarding securing periodic payments, the 1956 treaty stipulates that the Soviet Army is as liable to pay for facilities as the Polish Army. Nevertheless, units of the Soviet Army are not part of the Polish Army, and we have the right to charge higher payments from the Soviet Army. We have estimated our losses and the sums are substantial. The Polish Government is presenting bills on the basis of the agreement that followed the Mazowiecki-Ryzhkov talks last year.

Changes in the Soviet position take place very slowly. They have finally proposed a date for the withdrawal of troops. This date is not acceptable to us, but nonetheless, it is a date. I do not want to say anything on the complicated situation in Moscow, but it is a fact that the Soviet delegation's powers are very limited indeed. The smallest textual alterations have to be referred back to Moscow, and so another month passes before we can get around the negotiating table again. The next round of negotiations is scheduled to take place in Moscow on 14-15 March 1991.

Foreign Minister on Soviet Troop Pullout, Transit Issue

*LD1103232491 Warsaw PAP in English 2140 GMT
11 Mar 91*

[Text] Warsaw, March 11—"The pullout of Soviet troops from Poland could begin in April or May just like the transit of the Western Group of Soviet Troops from Germany. We have found understanding for this proposal," General Mikhail Moiseyev announced after his talks with Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

Moiseyev, who is the Chief of General Staff of Soviet Armed Forces, came to Warsaw today for two days of talks about the pullout of Soviet troops from this country.

Skubiszewski said, on the other hand, that "Should large Soviet units begin to leave Poland, it is possible that some transit could start. Its extent will be determined, which does not mean any change in our position that it is necessary to conclude agreements on the withdrawal of Soviet troops and their transit through our territory. Only then these matters will be fully settled. Flexibility requires that some moves be taken right now, but they are limited to some extent."

Skubiszewski described his nearly two-hour talks with the Soviet delegation as "open, firm at times, but frank and not avoiding any difficulties. [no closing quotation marks as received] Moiseyev said the talks were moving in the right direction.

The meeting, attended by Viktor Dubinin, commander-in-chief of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army, was held on the Polish initiative after Skubiszewski had suggested it to Soviet Defence Minister Yazov in Budapest.

Skubiszewski underscored that the problems of Soviet troops pullout and transit needed a fast solution or otherwise this would affect the Polish-Soviet relations.

"We want to avoid the problem of internationalization, but as we know other states, including some superpowers, call attention to the fact that Poland is a country which has failed to solve the question of pullout of Soviet troops till now," Skubiszewski told journalists.

Skubiszewski said Poland still held on to the end of this year as a deadline for Soviet troops pullout, but some margin of moving this way or another must be kept.

The Soviet side proposed an earlier date than mid-1994 for the pullout and argued that they had no accommodation for soldiers coming back from Germany and Poland before that date.

This argument recurs in all talks on withdrawal. Some 200 thousand apartments are said to be missing to accommodate Soviet officers coming back home.

Skubiszewski said Poland was ready to help on a commercial basis to construct apartments with its machinery stationed in the Soviet Union but the talks on this matter were very slow.

Another round of experts' talks stated that is not up to a foreign minister to make such proposals. General Moiseyev declared that one should avoid statements causing friction and unnecessary conflicts."

Dubinin had earlier made a number of statements which caused an uproar in Warsaw among them that Moscow would not pull all its troops out of Poland before the transit operation was complete.

Country 'Technically' Ready for Soviet Withdrawal

*LD1103193191 Warsaw PAP in English 1459 GMT
11 Mar 91*

[Text] Warsaw, March 11—Poland is technically prepared for the operation of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and their transit through this country from Germany, head of the office of the Polish Council of Ministers, chairman of the inter-ministerial commission for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland Krzysztof Zabinski said during a press conference here today.

Zabinski added that negotiations are continued and despite differences of opinions as to the date of the withdrawal, the Polish Government hopes that the talks will lead to a satisfactory solution.

Defense Minister on Troop Withdrawal Talks With USSR

*LD1203172891 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1500 GMT 12 Mar 91*

[Interview with National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk by unidentified reporter on 12 March; place not given—recorded]

[Text] General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, who has been in Poland since yesterday, was holding talks in the Ministry of National Defense this morning. This is what Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk had to say:

[Kolodziejczyk] During today's meeting we were talking about bilateral contacts. The talks will be continued next week at the expert level.

[Reporter] Referring to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and their transit, has the Soviet side given up the plan to use the overland route?

[Kolodziejczyk] It is unclear. Not the overland route, because I am sure they will want to use rail routes, but they want to give up road transport, which is probably in keeping with our expectations, not only of the military staff, but also of the citizens in our country. All this is

pleasing, and I stress once again that this was not the main subject of our talks, that the Soviet side's stand has become flexible. Our Soviet guests indicated their great difficulties, great problems, beginning with housing, barracks [word indistinct] structures. We treat all this with full understanding, but we are stressing that we have our own problems, including housing.

Walesa, Gorbachev To Set Date for Troop Pullout

*LD1203143291 Warsaw PAP in English 1323 GMT
12 Mar 91*

[Text] Warsaw, March 12—In my opinion the date of final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland will be fixed at a meeting between Presidents Lech Walesa and Mikhail Gorbachev. Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of Soviet Army general staff, said after his talks at the Polish National Defence Ministry today.

As regards the transit of Soviet units from Germany via Poland, the Soviet side will not use the road transport but sea and rail one, Moiseyev added.

Soviet, Polish Officials Comment on Troop Withdrawal Talks

*LD1203184291 Warsaw PAP in English 1823 GMT
12 Mar 91*

[Text] Warsaw, March 12—"I think that the date for completing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland will be fixed during a meeting between President Lech Walesa and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev," the Soviet army chief of staff, General Mikhail Moiseyev

said after his talks at the Ministry of National Defence here and added that the task of diplomats and military experts was to set flexible dates which would fit both sides.

Moiseyev told reporters that USSR would not use road transport for the withdrawal of its troops from Germany and the Soviet units would make their exit by sea and to some extent by rail. Referring to the decision of the USSR to withdraw from Legnica, western Poland, within the next six months of the Soviet command of the so called "Western theater", comprising the units stationed in east Germany, Poland's Minister of National Defence Piotr Kolodziejczyk said it was a step of major political importance. Housing problems and the lack of social infrastructure for returning soldiers are the main obstacle in the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, Kolodziejczyk said.

Talks in Poland concerned also bilateral military cooperation, European security system that Poland is going to build through bilateral contacts.

General Moiseyev met also with Minister of State in the President's Office Jacek Merkel and with the head of the Council of Ministers, Minister Krzysztof Zabinski. "There are chances that some 10,000 Soviet soldiers could leave Poland between April and May," Zabinski said and added that final decisions will be made during the fifth round of talks to be held in Moscow on March 19.

The Soviet side said no chemical weapon was deployed on the territory of Poland and after the talks it seems that on-site inspections could be held which would confirm good intentions of the USSR in this field, Zabinski said.

ARGENTINA**Iraqi Bribes in Condor-2 Missile Project Viewed**

PY0803213991 Sao Paulo *O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO* in Portuguese 7 Mar 91 p 11

[By special correspondent Flavio Tavares]

[Text] The Iraqi Government made multimillion-dollar investments in Argentina between 1985 and 1989, but it is not likely that Saddam Husayn had acquired farms, mansions, or other assets in that country, investments that were reported in the Italian magazine IL MONDO.

At least, there is no clear visible evidence of that fact. If he did buy them then his front men are so well hidden and protected that it will be difficult to identify them, except through the dictator's own secret files.

What is beginning to emerge now, however, is the other side of the Iraqi multimillion-dollar investment: The corruption that Husayn sowed among government officials and some private sectors to facilitate and accelerate the development of the Condor 2 missile project. It is believed that Iraq invested between \$1.5 and \$2.2 billion in those four years during which the missile was being developed, a period that culminated with a "successful" testing in April 1989 at a secret base in Patagonia, southern Argentina.

Everything was secret. In record time (in a country where everything is slow), a consortium of private enterprises built for the Argentine Air Force the secret base called Falda del Carmen, in the mountains of Cordoba Province. There, during the government of Raul Alfonsin, Argentine Air Force experts worked with technicians from German, Italian, and U.S. private enterprises. The contract was also secret. Alfonsin signed an "accord" with the Egyptian Government, which performed as the Iraqi front at a time when Husni Mubarak and Saddam Husayn were living their romantic "Islamic Brothers" period, an episode that broke up shortly afterward.

It is commonly said now that secrecy was possible only because the operation was lubricated with bribes and "petty cash" funds. Current Argentine Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo openly made that insinuation when he officially disclosed that secret contracts concerning the Condor 2 missile had been signed by Alfonsin and his ministers.

When he mentioned the secret accord, two months ago, Cavallo was still the foreign minister. As such, he had access to the secret protocols of which, until then, the Argentine Government had denied all knowledge. Many believe that between 15 and 25 percent of the Iraqi

investments were split into many so-called secret "petty cash" funds and distributed among the different circles that had made the transaction easier.

There are doubts about whether Argentina in fact managed to export some of the missiles to Iraq following the Patagonia tests. Defense Minister Erman Gonzalez has just said in Egypt that no missiles were exported, and thus the only lethal outcome of the project was the corruption, of which today all Argentines are suspicious, especially those who are trying to explain this ambitious program that Iraq believed to be the goose that would lay the golden eggs that would arm its armies.

BRAZIL**Government To Choose Foreign Satellite Launcher**

PY0703155691 Rio de Janeiro *O GLOBO* in Portuguese 28 Feb 91 p 23

[By Jose Eustaquio de Freitas]

[Text] Sao Jose dos Campos—The Brazilian Government will use its political judgment in its choice of the rocket that will, next year, launch the first data-collecting satellite to have been designed and built in the country by the National Institute of Space Research (INPE).

Considering the cost and the technological cooperation offers, the Aeronautics Ministry would rather opt for the proposal submitted by the Soviet enterprise Glavkosmos, but will leave open the possibility of choosing the U.S. rocket Pegasus, as an example of rapprochement with the United States.

Both rockets cost approximately \$10 million each, but the Soviet proposal includes the transfer of technology, the possibility of using the Alcantara launching site (Maranhao) for the launch, and the initiation of a broad space cooperation program. The U.S. proposal is based on a system in which the rocket is launched from a plane at an altitude of 10,000 meters.

The choice of launch vehicles was the main topic of discussion at a meeting of the Brazilian Council for Space Activities held at INPE. The council will submit to President Fernando Collor de Mello a report on the proposals, but will give the government the option to decide based on the interests of Brazilian foreign policy.

According to military sources, the Soviet proposal is more advantageous, but political factors must be considered, especially in the wake of the dubious positions adopted by Brazil in relation to the Persian Gulf war. According to those sources, choosing the Soviet rocket could widen the gap between the Brazilian foreign policy and U.S. interests.

INDIA

Government Denies Possessing Chemical Weapons

BK1103144491 Delhi Domestic Service in English
1430 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] India has denied a report appearing in a section of the press that it probably possessed chemical weapons. An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said in New Delhi today that the report is baseless.

ISRAEL

Soviet Role Said Important for Regional Arms Control

T40803141891 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
8 Mar 91 p B1

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "Holding on to Both Ends of the Rope"]

[Text] Secretary of State James Baker's starting point on Middle East arms control is problematic. The official proposal was raised after enormous quantities of weapons, equipment, and ammunition have been funneled into the Middle East because of the war. The contents of entire European ammunition depots that lay unused for years were transferred to Saudi Arabia. It makes no economic sense to return a large part of that equipment to the United States. The alternative is to leave part of the equipment and the weapons in Middle East depots, or to hand them over somehow to the regional countries. This may turn out to be the solution. Even before the war Washington reached a similar agreement with Jerusalem—that deal involved a modest sum (\$100 million)—about the stationing of U.S. equipment and ammunition in Israel.

Yet this forms only part of the overall picture. Immediately after the invasion of Kuwait, the administration in Washington struck a gigantic arms deal with Saudi Arabia to the tune of more than \$24 billion. As always, a myriad of explanations were found to justify the deal and to explain how it will not jeopardize Israel. To the chagrin of the administration, and contrary to its explicit request, Israel took action in Congress to foil that deal. Indeed, Congress at the time expressed its deep annoyance and the administration was forced to slash the deal to approximately a third of its original dimensions and defer, for a while, the lion's share. Several months later the Saudis, for their part, also announced their desire to put off the deal until after the war. They will raise the demand again soon, and some people have already expressed their opinion about the need to substantially enlarge the Saudi Army, despite the decisive victory over Saddam Husayn.

If this fantastic arms deal goes through, the problem will extend far beyond Israel's safety in the face of an Arab world in a state of war with it. This will be the death blow

to the idea of arms control in the Middle East. No explanation will be able to justify that gargantuan deal. It is inconceivable on the one hand to raise the notion of arms control in the Middle East and suggest a cutback in the size of the forces, and on the other hand to sign deals the scope of which has never been seen in all the world. If the United States had accompanied its proposal for a regional arms control conference with a joint communiqué with Riyadh on the cancellation of the huge weapons deal, it would have gained a tremendous psychological achievement, and Saudi Arabia, too, would have benefited.

There is also a Soviet angle to this picture. Even during the war it became known that a delegation from Damascus had concluded a new weapons deal in Moscow. But the Syrians did not stop at that. They have long been looking for weapons they cannot purchase in the USSR, such as surface-to-surface missiles more precise and longer in range than the Scuds, in the PRC and North Korea. The question is: Why does al-Asad need these weapons systems? Why should he increase his military when he knows that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has, over the past few years, decreased its manpower due to the economic situation? Clearly these deals will be financed by the money al-Asad will receive for joining the anti-Iraq coalition. Instead of directing all that aid money to the limping Syrian economy, a lot of money will be spent on weapons. This deal is also not good news insofar as the suggestion for regional arms control is concerned.

Those who think that it is possible to discuss arms control in the Middle East but to confine that discussion only to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons while totally ignoring the broader question of the dangers enveloped in conventional weapons, are very much mistaken. The discussion must be all-encompassing. Israel cannot be expected to discuss disarmament while the Arab side equips itself with conventional and non-conventional weapons. Ironically, it was the authors of the latest UN report on regional nuclear disarmament who fathomed the sensitivity of the matter and pointed out Israel's unique security problems. Israel will not object to arms control but will probably declare that it is necessary to first discuss controlling and limiting conventional weapons, which will also include surface-to-surface missiles.

Many rush to mention in this context the East-West arms control and disarmament agreements in Europe. But there is a substantial difference between the two. Europe never experienced a situation in which one side does not recognize the other's right to exist. In the Middle East, however, not only are the Arab countries in a state of war with Israel, but some of them do not even recognize its right to exist. Additionally, their attitude toward the political setup and statehood is also very different (see, for example, Syria's attitude toward Lebanon as an independent country; or that of Iraq toward Kuwait).

Despite this fundamental difference, it took the Europeans more than 15 years to reach achievements worth mentioning in the sphere of disarmament and arms control.

The starting point in the Middle East should not be the question of how to make Israel give up its nuclear weapons, which everyone claims it has for defensive purposes, but a far more seminal discussion of the

definition of threats and intentions, the elimination of military misunderstandings and surprises, and a cutback in the scope of conventional weapons. Yet for this the United States needs the Soviet Union. No arms control discussion for the region can be held without Moscow, one of the chief weapons suppliers which has not given up additional future sales. This, in a way, is the answer to the question of whether Moscow will play a role in the establishment of a new Middle East order.

GENERAL

Canadian Proposal to Restrict Arms Trade Viewed

91WC00664 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 16 Feb 91
Second Edition p 5

[Article by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "The Committee for the Coordination of the Export of 'Strategic' Goods from NATO Countries Along the Vertical?"]

[Text] The Prime Minister of Canada Mulroney recently came forward with an initiative which, in my view, is extremely interesting and urgent. He proposed to convene, within the framework of the United Nations, a worldwide summit meeting for the purpose of limiting the trade in military technology, and, above all, not allowing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missiles.

The seizure of Kuwait, which served to detonate the military conflict in the Persian Gulf, reminded mankind that the repudiation of the confrontation between East and West is capable of giving rise to a "threat from the South." The flow of weapons, which has become unnecessary in Europe, may gush into the developing countries, fanning old and igniting new regional conflicts. The bitter paradox consists in the fact that the multinational forces under the banner of the United Nations are fighting Iraq, which created its military potential with the participation of all five permanent members of the Security Council. It is only a pity that their so rare unanimity was manifested in the desire to arm Saddam Husayn, and not in the readiness to sacrifice these billions of dollars to fight hunger and disease.

On the other hand, at the time when the USSR and the United States are taking the first steps toward disarmament, and other industrial powers even if they only acknowledge the necessity to embark upon this path, the Third World continues to arm itself feverishly. The military budgets of the developing countries come to an average of six percent of their gross national product, which exceeds by a factor of six the expenditures for health, and by a factor of more than two the expenditures for education.

The detente between East and West is turning into a "pseudoconversion", that is the pumping over of masses of military equipment from North to South, from the developed to the developing countries. Thanks to the free access to the latest weaponry and the technology for its production, any aggressive regime can become a threat to its neighbors, to the entire world. How not to permit this?

I think the most urgent task is to fully prohibit chemical weapons, which thanks to their cheapness are sometimes called the "atomic bomb of beggars." The threats that are being heard from Baghdad concerning the use of poisonous substances reminds us of the necessity of completing more quickly the work on an appropriate international convention.

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, signed in 1968 on the initiative of the USSR, the United States, and England, played a considerable role in curbing the arms race in this very dangerous sector. It has been joined by more than 140 states that have received international access to the peaceful use of the atom in exchange for an obligation not to produce nuclear warheads.

Things are worse with rocket weaponry. Only in 1987, the members of the "Big Seven" (United States, Japan, FRG, England, France, Italy, and Canada) decided to introduce limitations on the sale of ballistic missiles, as well as the technology for their production. In my view, it would be desirable for the USSR and the PRC to join this agreement officially.

However, even conventional military technology may become a threat to international security. One can only regret that in 1978 the Soviet-American negotiations on arms trade were broken off. Perhaps now, after the end of the "Cold War", the time has come to create something similar to the notorious Committee for the Coordination of the Export of "Strategic" Goods from NATO Countries. But already not in order to conceal from the East the scientific-technical achievements of the West, but in order not to permit the transfer of the arms race from the North to the South. The world summit meeting proposed by the prime minister of Canada would lead to a single channel of negotiation in regard to the various aspects of the problem. For this reason, the initiative of Mulroney, in my view, deserves support.

Legislators Meet With WEU Assembly Members

LD2802231491 Moscow TASS in English 2134 GMT
28 Feb 91

[By correspondent Igor Kuleshov]

[Text] Paris, February 28 (TASS)—Aspects of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West European Union (WEU) were discussed during the meeting between Soviet parliamentarians and representatives of this military alliance of Western countries in Paris on Thursday.

The Soviet delegation led by deputy chairman of the Soviet parliament Aleksandr Mokanu held a series of meetings with WEU Assembly members and representatives of its various committees.

During the meetings, the sides discussed problems of disarmament, the creation on the European continent of a system of mutual trust and cooperation and the further development of the CSCE process.

The burden of armaments weighs down on the Soviet economy with incredible force, the head of the Soviet delegation told TASS. This is why our talks with WEU representatives focused on disarmament problems, defence sufficiency and the conversion of military production.

Great interest was evoked by our proposal to develop by concerted efforts and launch with the help of a Soviet booster-rocket an artificial earth satellite to monitor ecological processes in the Gulf, the Aral Sea and other regions of the globe.

Contacts with WEU representatives, first established in 1987, grow more productive from year to year, Aleksandr Mokanu stressed.

As regards WEU, WEU Assembly Chairman Robert Pontillon said, we proposed creating a satellite to control disarmament processes. He said that the West European and Soviet representatives considered the possibility of setting up working groups to discuss problems of mutual interest.

The sides also discussed the development of mutual trade and prospects for cancelling limits imposed by the Export Control Committee (COCOM) on exports to the Soviet Union of Western technologies.

Yazov Calls for Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction

*LD0403145991 Moscow International Service
in Slovak 1800 GMT 3 Mar 91*

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry Yazov, USSR minister of defense, by Aleksandr Privakov; place and date not given; Yazov responses are in Russian fading to Slovak translation—recorded]

[Text] [Privakov] Foreign listeners asked us about reform in the Soviet Army and how to answer people who see in the Soviet soldiers a danger of return to a totalitarian regime.

[Yazov] I would like to say that the Army was created for peoples' protection. The Army will never take a stand against its people. Many people point out that it did so in Lithuania and Tbilisi. How is it possible? An action of a unit cannot be seen as an action of the whole Army. This is the first thing. Apart from this I cannot accept reproaches to the Army that people died as a result of weapons fired by the Army. Neither wounds nor pictures can show clearly who fired in the places mentioned. I want to stress that the Soviet Army will serve the entire state and all its peoples. We have the wherewithal to defend and the wherewithal to protect against aggressors. The Soviet strategic means are in continuous state of combat readiness. Here I mean missile troops, nuclear submarines, and heavy bombers that are capable of using missiles with nuclear warheads. When we conclude the treaties, for example with the United States, we aim at excluding nuclear weapons. We know what they can cause and we how they can threaten all of mankind. The aim is to eradicate the stockpile of nuclear weapons and to guarantee a safe life to humankind.

There are also other means of mass destruction that also need to be eradicated. There are, for example, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The Soviet Armed Forces are not a threat to any state and won't be in the future either. Why would they otherwise leave Eastern Europe and Mongolia? The USSR wants to have friends in the west, in the east, and the south. We have good relations with Iran, Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, and Britain. The world today is in such a state that we do not need to expect a great war. Naturally it is guaranteed that no state would succeed pushing a war on the world community.

[Privakov] What do you wish to all listeners around the world who have been listening to this bulletin?

[Yazov] Regardless of nationality, age, or sex, the greatest wish of them all might be to hear from a minister of defense, a military official, the wish for life and peace. Only peace can secure serenity, happiness, joy, and plenitude. A simple man, his family, and the entire world will not accept anything that leads to war. To live in peace means to achieve understanding and well-being. This will bring its fruit to all nations and to every individual family.

START TALKS

Bessmertnykh: Draft Treaty To Be Ready 'Within Next Few Weeks'

*PM0103095891 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE
in English: undated*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh by Vladimir Markov; date and place not given: "Aleksandr Bessmertnykh Talks To Novosti"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Markov] It might seem lately that the disarmament process could be in danger of slowing down, particularly owing to the problems which have arisen in exchanging data on conventional armaments in Europe, might it not?

[Bessmertnykh] It's just possible that one got such an impression. In actual fact, however, work at the talks proceeds intensively. I think that the drafting of the Soviet-US treaty on strategic offensive arms will be concluded within the next few weeks.

As far as the exchange of additional data on the treaty on conventional armed forces, which took place the other day, is concerned, there will also be no special problems arising here, I think. Though the interpretation of some articles of the treaty should be clarified. After all, the Soviet leadership favours a dynamic continuation of the talks on arms control and disarmament.

Missile Site Visited; Yazov Program Announced

LD1003180791

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian at 1530 GMT

on 10 March, in its regular "Vremya" newscast, broadcasts a 2-minute recorded video report by Igor Fesunenko on his visit to an undisclosed strategic missile regiment command post. Reception is fair.

Fesunenko says: "From here, from these control desks, by pushing the relevant buttons and turning the relevant keys, the most powerful and most terrible weapon ever invented by man—the intercontinental strategic missile, able to strike any goal at any point on earth—can be brought into action." The video shows Fesunenko pointing to a desk with five visible red buttons, three of which read: Information not received; Main; Reserve; and three boxes with keyholes, two of which read: Command; Launch.

Also shown are officers on duty, and various unexplained pieces of equipment, a door with danger signs, plaques reading Combat Post 1 and Combat Post 2. Fesunenko explains that officers are on duty permanently in order to ensure that the missiles are never launched, though naturally these officers are constantly changed, he points out. The video shows two officers, and then switches to a long low corridor.

Fesunenko suggests that viewers will want to know whether or not the missiles could be mistakenly launched. Fesunenko says: "You can learn the answer to that question and to many other questions, including any questions connected with our armed forces, in the next 'Who is Who' program, to be broadcast on 30 March—naturally on the first program—when the guest will be Marshal of the Soviet Union Yazov, USSR minister of defense. Please send in any questions which interest you, addressed to Marshal Yazov for this program, at 127000 Moscow, ul Akademika Koroleva 12."

Urgent Solution Needed for Faltering Arms Talks

PM1203134191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Mar 91 Second Edition p 5

[“Editorial Comments”: “Breakthrough Needed”]

[Text] It is known that in times of war the muses are silent. And diplomats too, evidently. In any case, their voices have not been heard much from Geneva, where the articles of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons [START] are being “polished.” While the war was blazing in the desert, and all attention was fixed on that, no one sounded the alarm. However, time is passing, and things are at a standstill in Geneva—in this case the treaty on strategic offensive weapons.

Meanwhile the treaty is being awaited in Moscow, where the Soviet-American summit that was postponed in February is to be held in the first half of this year. It is here that the two presidents are expected to sign this historic document.

There is no need to prove that it is historic. Even the slightest movement backwards of the hands on the “nuclear clock” makes it possible for mankind to breathe

more freely. And here we are talking about an unprecedented reduction of nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, the prospect of a nonnuclear world is opening up, and the whole international climate is changing for the better.

So what is the matter? Even a month ago, “negotiators” on both sides were reassuring the public that everything has been resolved and that only the “technicalities” remain, and now disjointed rumors are coming from Geneva about “unexpected” new complexities which threaten to postpone the signing of the treaty for an unspecified time. We are accusing “them” of inconsistency and of bringing out new complex approaches at the final stretch, and they accuse “us” of obduracy which they say reflects the “strengthened influence” of military circles on our foreign policy.

The truth is not always half-way between the two. Evidently the euphoria that overwhelmed the U.S. military department following the victory in the desert is having its effect here, in addition to the chorus of praises being sung there about the latest American weapons.

A solution needs to be sought urgently. It seems to us that the main thing is to see the aim behind the details of the talks. And it has stayed the same. It is not worth it for anyone, and that includes Washington, to disregard the fact that this is not just a question of weapons, but one of weapons of mass destruction, which do not leave anyone with a chance, and do not divide people into victors and vanquished.

And if these Geneva talks come to a standstill, if all these “levels” and “sub-levels” are not resolved, then we need to look at the experience of Reykjavik, for example. Even a “mini-summit” can rise above banal problems and make the necessary breakthrough in the talks. And in this case it is a question of a problem that is truly fateful for the whole world.

Everything that has been said also fully applies to what is going on in the Hofburg Palace in Vienna, where the “revision” of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is also dragging on. There is an increasing amount of “unjustified linkages,” as the diplomats express themselves opaquely. A breakthrough—and a quick one at that—is also needed here.

Let us note that the problem is not just one of dates, but one of stopping a negative tendency which is highly dangerous. After all, if it is allowed to develop, it may freeze Soviet-American dialogue for a certain time, even if it does not completely stifle it, and return tension to Europe.

This must be prevented.

Concern Over ‘Technicalities’ Delaying Treaty

LD1203185891 Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 12 Mar 91

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] During the talks the Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh held in Washington with James Baker and President Bush earlier this year, it was agreed to complete work on the remaining technicalities in February. Now we are almost in the middle of March and there are no reassuring reports from Geneva, where the draft treaty is being discussed. Evidently the technicalities that were to be agreed upon have grown into something more important. The participants in the talks do not conceal this. Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov says the Americans are inconsistent. At the last moment they put forward new, complex approaches which complicate work on the treaty. In their turn the Americans claim that the Soviet stand has hardened under pressure from the Soviet military-industrial complex.

I do not want to argue either claim. I think the truth lies somewhere in the middle. It seems that the euphoria caused by the easy victory over Iraq, where the Americans proved the superiority of their weapons, has made Washington—and primarily the Pentagon—regard the process of disarmament with unjustified lightness. A clear tendency is taking shape. Work on the strategic arms limitation treaty has come to a standstill, while in Vienna the [word indistinct] treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe is protracted groundlessly. This is the most alarming thing.

In the final count, it is not so important to agree on a certain clause of a document by a fixed date, for what is at stake is the question of the foundations of security, but what is unacceptable is to refrain from serious discussion and create artificial problems that turn talks into a talk shop.

The line of the Soviet Union and President Gorbachev is not changing. The Soviet Union stands for a strategic arms limitation treaty, for signing it during President Bush's visit to Moscow during the first half of the year. As far as I can understand, similar feelings prevail in the White House, though there are also opponents of compromise with the Soviet Union on questions of disarmament. James Baker's talks with the Soviet leadership in Moscow should clarify the situation. Despite the recent difficulties, I still think that there is going to be a breakthrough and work on the treaty will be completed in the near future.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Academician Denies Topaz Reactor SDI Role

91WC0068A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Feb 91 Union Edition p 6

[Report by S. Leskov on comments by Academician N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy: "The Soviet Reactor: Not To Be Used for SDI!"]

[Text] A number of news agencies have reported the sensational news that the U.S. Administration intends to

acquire from the USSR a space nuclear installation to use in work on its SDI program. Doubt was cast on this information by IZVESTIYA No 8 of this year. On the return from the United States of a Soviet delegation led by Academician N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, he explained to our IZVESTIYA correspondent what specifically occurred during the talks with the American side.

Academician N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, first deputy director of the Institute of Atomic Energy imeni Kurchatov, assured us that in the talks on the sale of a Topaz-2 nuclear power installation the Soviet side set two indispensable conditions. First, "know-how" in the design should not be violated and the reactor could not be dismantled. Second, the U.S. partners should provide firm guarantees that the device would not be used for military purposes.

Information linking SDI and the Soviet Topaz-2 reactor leaked to the Western press was immediately disavowed by U.S. experts who took part in the talks. J. Vetch, the president of the Space Power Company which is holding the talks with the USSR, made an official statement to the journal SPACE NEWS. Unfortunately, the rumors were not stopped. During the last visit a similar statement was made to the journal MILITARY NEWS by Academician N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy. It is the opinion of the Soviet scientist that the misunderstanding about the possible use of the Topaz-2 in the SDI program could have resulted from the fact that throughout the world there are organizations working in space research that are in one way or another connected with the military-industrial complex. In this case, however, there is no justification for doubting the control measures that have been planned. It is a question only of the possible use of the Topaz-2 after its ground tests for a communications satellite. Moreover, at this time there is no question of the delivery of nuclear fuel from the USSR to operate the Topaz-2 in orbit.

With respect to the initial information indicating that the Americans have been showing great interest in the Soviet reactor, it is fully in accord with the reality. As N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy said, he has never in his life seen Soviet equipment attract so much attention. Academician R. Sagdeev, who is presently living in the United States and who initially spoke out vigorously against the injection of nuclear reactors into orbit, changed his position when he had familiarized himself with the safety guarantees of the Topaz-2, and supported the sale of the Soviet installation for joint research offering the two sides great promise. The sensation about the Topaz-2 is explained by the fact that the United States stopped working in this direction and, according to its own assessments, made it possible for the USSR to get 10 years ahead.

All of this is a cunning move to flatter that self-esteem that of late has too often been wounded here. If the contract now being worked on (worth approximately \$10 million) to acquire a Topaz-2 is concluded, then the money received could be used to continue research in

this field, which is a priority for us. For in 1991 no funding has been allocated for work on a space-based thermal emission converter. One of the developers of the device that caused the sensation in the West is, within the framework of conversion, being switched to the production of packaging for dairy products. But you will not be seeing that in America...

Current Status of SDI Program Viewed

PM070315Z191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[G. Khromov article: "The Main Affair of the 20th Century: How Things Are Proceeding With the Implementation of the American SDI Program"]

[Text] Eight years have passed since the announcement in the United States of the so-called strategic defense initiative (SDI) program, which the public immediately nicknamed the Star Wars program. In the words of the then President R. Reagan, SDI was to defend the entire United States territory from a missile strike. At the same time, world public opinion also held it to be a means of safeguarding a first nuclear strike, as a country possessing global ABM defenses could rely on remaining unpunished in the event of such a strike. Furthermore, it was considered that the SDI program's implementation would bring the United States immense technical advantages.

To date the SDI program has already gobbled up more than \$20 billion. This is considerably more than the cost of the atomic bomb project, and almost as much as the project to put a man on the moon. And what are the results?

The program's originally declared aim has already been officially recognized as overambitious even for such a rich and technologically advanced country as the United States, and its newly declared aim—to defend very important facilities—confirms the appraisal given earlier of the possible aggressive orientation of the program, whose implementation might undermine the foundations of the agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, which is near to conclusion.

In the opinion of many specialists there has also been no serious technical progress. P. Zimmerman writes in the Pentagon publication DEFENSE NEWS (21 January 1991): "In the course of research in the field of strategic defense there have not been any new scientific discoveries, and not one of the concepts talked about back in 1983 has been significantly developed at all." Work in such areas as the development of a nuclear-pumped laser, charged particle beam generators, electrodynamic mass accelerators, and exciter lasers, which were considered to be essential at the beginning of the program, have been practically completely halted due to their scientific untenability or practical infeasibility.

At present the SDI program's developers still have a version of the system ("Brilliant Pebbles"), based on

kinetic kill principles, "on the boil." But, many specialists consider that this, too, is leading nowhere. This version envisages using many thousands of satellites put into orbit around the earth, each of which is equipped with its own motors, sensory systems, guidance systems, and kill systems. The technical and economic viability of such a system has not been confirmed. Many specialists claim that it is impossible to imagine a system which can be tested in no other conditions than in combat. And where will they find these conditions?

The present SDI project's authors themselves are thinking up Star Wars scenarios which look consistent, if only in the eyes of a simpleton. In particular, they are trying in every way to play up the nonnuclear interception of missiles and nuclear warheads, as this is the only case in which the radar, optical, thermal, and other tracking system sensors do not become "blinded"; and without these it is impossible to engage the system's kill systems. And here the projects' authors hush up the fact that the other side is not going to act in accordance with this scenario.

In order to extract any funds at all from Congress, SDI's backers resort to speculative statements. For example, according to them the Soviet Union is creating its own ABM defense system at an intensified pace, and in a number of areas—laser technology for one—has already superseded the United States. It has been claimed in the American publication SOVIET MILITARY POWER over a number of years that the world's first laser complex (such facilities are part of the SDI program's projects) which is capable of taking out American satellites, has been built and is operational at the Soviet testing range in the area of Saryshagan. But the very first visit to this testing range by representatives of the American public and American specialists in 1990, ended in the confusion of the authors of the said publication. The lasers in Saryshagan turned out not only to be incapable of taking out satellites, but cannot even be seen as prototypes of such types of arms.

In this connection I would like to point out that the move toward openness in the military sphere, including in work connected with ABM defenses, should secure the strengthening of trust between the countries. This is why at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, our country speaks in favor of securing predictability in the sides' activities regarding ABM defenses. Overall our intentions are clear—we are for the preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

However strange it may seem, the most responsible figures in the U.S. Administration are even using the events in the Persian Gulf to "push" the SDI program. See how effective the Patriot antimissile system is, they say, and how simple it is to destroy Iraqi Scud missiles with their help. You might ask: What has this got to do with the SDI program? Systems of the Patriot type relate to so-called tactical ABM defense, and include antimissile missiles with nonnuclear warheads and a real capability to effectively resolve the problem of defending

military facilities and cities against operational-tactical missiles which are also not equipped with nuclear warheads (such systems are not banned by the 1972 ABM Treaty). The Patriot system is of no significance for the balance of strategic nuclear forces, and to the present day has never been regarded as an element of strategic defense. As congressmen joke, the organization for the implementation of the SDI program "is simply trying to find itself a job to do," as, you see, it has to justify its existence somehow.

But, in respect of SDI's main element—its space-based systems—the Congress adopts a far from amusing attitude: During recent years it has regularly banned the administration from carrying out full-scale experiments in space to hone particular components of this program, seeking to prevent infringements of the ABM Treaty. Congress expressed its attitude toward the program in a yet more serious manner when it ratified the latest military budget.

Compared to the preceding year, appropriations for the year 1991 have been reduced for the first time during the program's lifetime. Moreover, Congress has reduced the appropriations by 25 percent at a stroke—to \$2.9 billion, and today the question of a further reduction in appropriations for fiscal 1992 is already being discussed. The legislators are clearly proceeding on the basis that it is not expedient to continue work on SDI with the aims and tasks originally set for it—it is at least necessary to fundamentally amend the program. In addition, some congressmen propose separating actual work on tactical ABM defense systems, handing this work over to the Army, from the specifically theoretical projects which are strictly speaking part of the SDI program; and this will, no doubt, be yet another obstacle to SDI's future.

It is obvious that in no small measure this attitude of the American Congress is determined by the whole gamut of the present-day realities of international relations, the strengthening of Soviet-American links, primarily in the field of disarmament, and the irreversible movement toward a world without nuclear wars.

Standing Consultative Commission Meeting Ends

LD0603175891 Moscow TASS in English 1426 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] Geneva, March 6 (TASS)—A regular session of the Soviet-American Permanent Consultative Commission ended here today.

The commission was set up in keeping with the Soviet-American memorandum on December 21, 1972 to promote the goals and provisions of the agreements on strategic arms limitation and measures to reduce the danger of a nuclear war, concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Soviet and American representatives agreed to hold the commission's next session in Geneva on July 16, 1991.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Moiseyev Cited on Troop Withdrawal From Germany

LD0703141991 Moscow TASS in English 1136 GMT 7 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, March 1 (TASS)—"The treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany on terms for a temporary stay and systematic withdrawal of Soviet troops from German territory, in a package with other accords, was a new step in a final settlement of relations with Germany," General of the Army Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, told TASS today on the eve of his participation in the work of the Soviet parliament Committee for Defence and State Security.

The committee is to discuss the item concerning terms for the temporary stay and systematic withdrawal of Soviet troops from German territory.

The treaty is designed "to maintain well-wishing relations between the population, various states and public organisations of Germany and Soviet troops on a "reciprocal basis and to resolve on a fair basis all arising contentious issues and provide ample opportunities for all activities connected with the stay and withdrawal of our troops," Moiseyev said.

"The position of the victor country gave us a moral right to put our conditions more toughly. But we did not follow that path. [words indistinct] the already adopted political decision to withdraw troops before the end of 1994 and taking into account the established inter-state relations," Moiseyev emphasised.

The treaty-determined time-span for the withdrawal of the Western Group of troops from Germany by the end of 1994 put the Soviet Defence Ministry into a rigid framework of planning for the withdrawal of troops, the removal of the stocks of material and technical means and their storing on Soviet territory and placed the troops of the Western Group confronted the troops of the western group with the fact of their stay and activities on German territory," Moiseyev said.

A plan and a time-table for the withdrawal of troops of the Western Group were coordinated and handed over to the German side at the end of December 1990, as provided for by the treaty, Moiseyev said.

In all, within the four years, about 500,000 servicemen, 114,000 units of hardware and 1.5 million tonnes of stocks of material and technical means are to be withdrawn, the general said. This will require more than 11,000 trains and up to 1,130 shipping runs, he added.

Considering the current situation and possibilities for the use of various types of transport, a yearly breakdown of the planned troop withdrawal percentage is as follows:

25-30 per cent in 1991, 30 per cent in 1992, 30 per cent in 1993, and 10-15 per cent in 1994. General Morseyev said.

Supreme Soviet Committee Views Army FRG Withdrawal

LD0103152791 Moscow Radio Rossiya Network
in Russian 1102 GMT 1 Mar 91

[Andrey Zyuev report on USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security session]

[Text] At a joint sitting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities today, deputies continued their discussion of the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers and then gave the draft law on foreign currency regulation its second reading.

But I had the good luck, for the first time, to gain admission—not far away, a couple of paces from here—to a sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Defense and State Security, where the ratification of the treaties between the USSR and the FRG, signed in September-November 1990, is being discussed. They are not run-of-the-mill treaties either, for us, for Germany, or for Europe.

As is known, the troop withdrawal is already under way. It has been planned in detail for this year and up to the end of 1994 roughly. I'll quote just a few figures. Over 43,000 of the 337,000 servicemen have already been withdrawn. And six of the divisions being withdrawn will be totally disbanded, since there is no room to station them anywhere. This was noted by Army General Morseyev, chief of the General Staff. Twenty-one cantonments have already been vacated, but the buildings and real estate that have been handed over are not being used by the German side and are deteriorating. But we have not yet received any compensation for them.

I personally had not suspected that the question of desertion in the area would give rise to such interest among those attending the sitting. In this connection, [Soyuz group leader] Deputy Alksnis recalled that the authorities in the FRG's eastern laender have received instructions not to return any deserter from the Soviet side, but to move all of them to the western part of Germany, to the town of Eisenberg in the Land of Baden-Wuerttemberg, where a special screening center, SASA, has been set up.

Speaking about the problem of desertion, Defense Ministry spokesman pointed out that the social aspect is one of the spurs to these acts. But Deputy Sharin, who was presiding over the committee meeting, disagreed with this, objecting that seasoned officers as well as conscripts are running off.

It has been calculated that 11,000 trains will be needed to withdraw the Western Group of Forces. At a rate of four trainloads a day, Deputy Alksnis made a simple mathematical calculation and pointed out that the chore

would take about 8 years. Army General Morseyev then noted that, owing to disagreements on this matter with the Polish side, the troop withdrawal is now taking place via the Navy and military air transport. People's deputies wanted to know whether, following the troop withdrawal from Germany in 1994, our state would still be out of pocket or not. But it emerged that no one knows.

General on Troop Withdrawal From East Europe

LD0103171791 Moscow TASS in English 1101 GMT
1 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, March 1 (TASS)—“The withdrawal of the central (Czechoslovakia) and southern (Hungary) groups of troops will be completed by June 30, 1991,” Colonel-General Gherman Burutin, first deputy head of a main department of the Soviet Armed Forces’ general staff, told TASS today in view of the completion of a regular phase of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East European countries and Mongolia.

Soviet troops are being withdrawn from the region “strictly in accordance with the Soviet Union’s unilateral initiative, intergovernmental agreements and plans,” Burutin said.

In all, more than 223,000 servicemen, over 8,000 tanks, about 4,000 artillery systems, and more than 760 aircraft have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe and Mongolia in 1987-1991, the general said.

Yet to be withdrawn are as follows: 15 percent of the personnel and up to 10 percent of hardware from the central group of troops, 20 percent of the personnel and up to 15 percent of hardware from the southern group of troops; the small contingent of troops remaining in Mongolia will be finally withdrawn in 1992, Burutin said.

In accordance with the earlier concluded agreements between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, a withdrawal of the western group of troops from the territory of Germany has been started, he pointed out.

The withdrawal plan for the first two months of this year has been implemented in the whole. More than 16,000 servicemen, about 500 tanks and over 230 artillery systems have been withdrawn. At the same time, the general believes, the systematic character of the withdrawal of Soviet troops is being substantially influenced by the attitude of the leadership of a number of East European countries that raised transportation fare.

“The non-constructive stand, taken by ‘the Polish Government that hampers the transit of troop trains and motor convoys of the western group of troops across Polish territory, required the introduction of substantial changes to the transportation plans,’ General Burutin emphasised.

CFE Group on Transfer of Three Infantry Divisions

UD0103203991 Moscow TASS in English 1727 GMT
1 Mar 91

[Vladimir Smelov report]

[Text] Vienna, March 1 (TASS)—A joint consultative group of the Warsaw Pact and NATO is continuing its work in the Austrian capital. It was created for promoting the attaining of goals and the fulfilment of provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces [CFE] in Europe, including the settlement of differences in interpretations, which can emerge in the process of the fulfilment of the treaty.

Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, head of the Soviet delegation in the consultative group, believes that the results of its work still leave much to be desired, since progress has been practically blocked by a discussion started over the article of the treaty dealing with the use of rules of calculating armaments and military hardware, which are subject to reduction.

Many delegations had questions dealing with the transfer of three Soviet motorised infantry divisions to coastal guard troops. Attempts were made to interpret this step as the violation by the Soviet Union of its treaty commitments. However, the motorised infantry divisions were transferred to coastal guard troops as early as in 1989. The Soviet Union decided to consolidate its coastal defence as part of the reorganisation of the Armed Forces in accordance with the defence doctrine. When ground forces were dramatically reduced, it became obvious that it was necessary to have specialised coastal guard units for defending coastal zones.

Burkay-Genscher Bonn Meeting Reported

PM0103101191 Moscow KR 4SN 4Y4 ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Major S. Popov report: "Meeting in Bonn"]

[Text] On 26 February a meeting was held in Bonn between Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, and H.-D. Genscher, FRG foreign minister.

Col. Gen. Burlakov informed Genscher about progress in the withdrawal of forces, the tasks being resolved by the personnel in the new conditions, and other aspects of the life and activity of the Western Group of Forces. A mutual desire was expressed for the further development of amicable relations based on mutual respect between the servicemen and the local population.

The FRG foreign minister accepted with thanks an invitation to visit a unit of the Western Group of Forces.

Last Soviet Missiles Leave Hungary

PM0103133991 Moscow KR 4SN 4Y4 ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

["News Service" report under general heading: "Army and Navy"]

[Text] Last Soviet Missiles Leave Hungary

Colonel N. Botov, commander of an anti-aircraft missile unit, and F. Schmidt, mayor of the Hungarian city of Mor, shook hands for a long time, patted each other on the shoulder, and talked animatedly about something. Incidentally, they were not alone. All Soviet missile men and staff officers of the Southern Group of Forces bid a friendly farewell to local inhabitants and representatives of the Hungarian Army, exchanging souvenirs and badges.

This event took place at the Bodajk railroad station prior to the departure of a Soviet military train carrying the last missiles.

Moiseyev on Troop Withdrawal Treaty With FRG Implementation

PM0103140591 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by correspondent V. Badurkin; place and date not given; first paragraph is introduction: "Army General M. Moiseyev: Treaty With FRG Is Working"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet has embarked on the examination and ratification of a package of treaties and agreements between the USSR and the FRG, the key element being the treaty "on the terms for the temporary residence and planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the FRG." Although the treaty has so far been ratified only by one side—the FRG—in reality its provisions have been "working" since October 1990. The five months since then make it possible to assess the effectiveness of the agreements which have been concluded. Our correspondent V. Badurkin talks about this with the chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Badurkin] Mikhail Alekseyevich, before assessing the effectiveness of the provisions of the treaty, please tell us what the Western Group of Forces is like.

[Moiseyev] The grouping of our forces in central Europe arose as a result of the defeat of fascism. It is the most powerful of our forces' groupings both in terms of its effective combat strength (six armies, including an air army) and in terms of its numerical strength (337,800 servicemen), weapons, level of skill, and degree of combat training. Here are just a few figures for the sake of clarity. The Western Group of Forces has 777 military townships, 47 airfields, and 59 testing grounds and drill fields. The overall value of its buildings and installations is 2.9 billion rubles.

[Badurkin] The treaty submitted for ratification is assessed differently by specialists and the public. That applies particularly to the schedule for our troops' withdrawal...

[Moiseyev] Yes, the schedule is indeed very tough. Incidentally, the General Staff counted on a minimum of about seven years. But life and the political realities of present-day Europe dictate their own terms. We were obliged to agree to the troops' withdrawal by the end of 1994. In all over the course of four years we will have to withdraw about 550,000 men, 114,000 units of equipment, and 1.5 million tonnes of material and technical stocks.

[Badurkin] And you believe you will be able to withdraw all that?

[Moiseyev] The General Staff has compiled a plan and schedule for the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces. It has been coordinated and handed to the German side, as stipulated by the treaty, at the end of December 1990. With a consideration for the existing situation and the potential for the use of various types of transport, we have planned in each of the first three years to withdraw 30 percent of the troops and to withdraw the remaining 10 percent in the last year, 1994. Over 11,000 trains and 1,130 ship voyages will be needed for that.

[Badurkin] Recently the cost of rail shipments both in Germany and in Poland has increased substantially. In addition the stance taken by the Polish Government is impeding the transit of our troops' trains and motor vehicle convoys.

[Moiseyev] All this is giving us considerable additional worries. Some of the plan's provisions are having to be corrected on the move, so to speak. For instance, we have had to increase the volume of sea and air shipments. The main brunt has been borne by the forces of the Baltic Fleet and military transport aircraft and ships of the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.

Today these questions have already been resolved. In addition the German side has agreed to finance transport not to its own ports, as previously planned, but to Soviet ports. As far as the Poles are concerned I personally believe they will review their position. After all at present their railroads are not fully loaded. In any case we shall fulfill the withdrawal plan. That is borne out by the fact that despite all kinds of difficulties as of 1 March we had withdrawn about 44,000 servicemen, 3,849 tanks, 1,746 combat vehicles, and 988 guns and mortars from the Western Group of Forces.

[Badurkin] One of the most acute problems connected with the troops' withdrawal is the housing problem...

[Moiseyev] Yes, that is indeed the main problem. The troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia went to virtually all the garrisons where there were free stocks or where the density could be increased. All possible measures are now being taken to provide normal facilities for

the units being withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces and to organize their planned combat training.

Matters are more complicated with regard to housing for officers and ensigns. We need about 54,000 apartments for family men and hostels for 13,000 bachelors. As you can see, the agreement with the German side to construct 36,000 apartments at its expense does not solve the problem. To this end a "Conversion-housing" consortium has been formed under the USSR Defense Ministry, including eight plants of the Western Group of Forces with the subsequent participation of the German firm "Bison Werke" in the matter. We are also hoping for assistance from the organs of power at the units' new places of deployment.

[Badurkin] You have outlined far from all the problems that have to be resolved during the withdrawal. It is primarily the Defense Ministry that will have to resolve them. During the discussion of the treaties many of your colleagues subjected them to serious criticism. Some suggested being in no hurry with the ratification. What is the position of the chief of General Staff?

[Moiseyev] Alongside the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and other interested departments, the Defense Ministry also took an active part in preparing the treaties and agreements. Of course not all, but many, of our proposals and wishes were taken into account. I would not say that all provisions of the documents that have been signed are irreproachable or suit us. But as a whole I want to stress that in the entire package of questions that were examined a big step has been taken in the full regulation of relations with Germany. Here are just a few specific examples. The treaties enshrine Germany's definitive borders. It has been emphasized that combat operations will never be launched in future from its territory. A "ceiling" has been set for the bundeswehr—370,000 men. The package of agreements develops and strengthens trust between our countries and maintains peace and stability in Europe.

Of course, this will seem too little for some of our citizens, especially the front line veterans. I have received proposals, even demands, to use the right of the victory state, right up to dictating our terms. From a purely human viewpoint I understand these people and share their pain and anxiety. But from the viewpoint of large-scale political and with a consideration for the realities of existing interstate relations, we could not travel that path. I believe the package of treaties must be ratified. Another question is the development and tuning of the mechanism for their implementation. That is what we must think about now above all.

[Badurkin] Considering the experience of withdrawing troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it may be supposed that the property question will become a very vexed one.

[Moiseyev] That is precisely what I am saying. By agreement between the USSR and FRG governments,

the determination of the composition, cost, and form of sale of immovable property which we one is being implemented by a Soviet-German commission specially created for the purpose. Its chairman on our side is K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations. It is five months since the treaty and agreement were signed but to this day the commission has not finished work on the procedure for selling this property. For instance, in the first quarter of this year the Group announced the handing over of 35 military townships and 44 buildings to the German side. But this property is not being sold. The buildings and installations which have been handed over remain essentially ownerless and are being plundered and are falling into disuse.

Matters are no better regarding mobile property. As of today a contract has been signed only for the sale of lignite and coal dust to the sum of about 0.5 million marks. And in the Western Group of Forces we have much that it is by no means compulsory (and which is indeed disadvantageous) to export into the union: scrap metal, fuel and lubricants, motor transport assets, engineering, chemical, armored, and other equipment.

There are great complications with regard to the sale of capital facilities. The point is that under international laws (including FRG laws) the owner of immobile property is the owner of the land, and naturally Germany has no intention of selling land to us or to other countries. It is essential urgently to seek partners, mainly from among FRG citizens and firms. According to my information, those who want to conclude contracts with us and even to create joint ventures in Germany do exist. It is up to the efficiency of Soviet specialists and primarily the specialists of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. But as it happens there are few of them in the Western Group of Forces, and those who are there as a rule stay only for a while.

Our thriftlessness, inefficiency, and bad management could do a "good service" to the German side's desire to obtain the maximum profit and could leave us looking like fools, so to say.

[Badurkin] And one last question, but an important one for us all. We asserted for a long time that the Western Group of Forces was our outpost, our shield against NATO. How will its abolition affect the USSR's defense capability?

[Moiseyev] Of course, such events cannot pass without leaving a trace or painlessly. I repeat that the Western Group of Forces is our most powerful and combat-capable grouping. But I do not think the situation should be dramatized. First, in shifting to a defensive doctrine we have taken a number of specific strategic steps which will make it possible to reduce the negative consequences of the elimination of our foreign groups of forces. In particular new groupings of ground forces, air defense, and the air force are being created in regions adjacent to our Western borders. Second, we hope that the NATO leaders' peace-loving statements will not remain on

paper alone. Third, and that is the main thing, our state's defense capability is ensured by nuclear parity with the West and here so far everything is in order.

Burlakov on 1994 Troop Withdrawal From FRG

*LD0503181591 Berlin ADN in German 1744 GMT
5 Mar 91*

[Text] Berlin [no date as received] (ADN)—According to Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, the Soviet Union is interested in withdrawing its troops from Germany by 1994. As Burlakov said at a news conference in Berlin on Tuesday, 25 to 30 percent of the forces are to be withdrawn from East German territory in 1991, up to 30 percent in 1992, 30 percent in 1993, and 10 to 15 percent in 1994.

Burlakov criticized the attitude of the Polish leadership, which will not let the Soviet troops pass through Poland. Hence the withdrawal has to be organized by air and sea. This route is twice as long and expensive. In spite of this, the set date will be adhered to. In all, some 500,000 people have to be transferred to the Soviet Union, along with their equipment and material supplies.

According to Burlakov, there are 388,000 soldiers and 184,000 family members in Germany. The army consists of 112 units with military equipment, including 5,000 tanks, 620 fighter aircraft, 790 helicopters, and 2.5 million tonnes of ammunition.

The withdrawal plan will be given precise form on a monthly basis and presented to the Bundeswehr Command East. Burlakov further announced that up to now 40 military sites worth 800 million marks have been handed over to the Bundeswehr. The colonel general said that the Soviets' sites in the former GDR are worth 10.5 billion marks. The Soviet side is interested in realizing the value of these sites, and using the revenue to build homes for the returning soldiers and officers.

Up to now, 152 members of the army have deserted, including 39 officers.

CSBM Seminar on Military Doctrine Planned

*LD0603170491 Moscow TASS in English 1626 GMT
6 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, March 6 (TASS)—A regular plenary meeting of parties to the Vienna talks on confidence-building measures and security [CSBM] in Europe focused today on the holding of a seminar on military doctrines. It is to be attended by top military leaders from CSCE states.

Several speakers stressed that the seminar brooked no delay, since the situation on the continent was changing rapidly to the tune of political reforms in European countries. They said it was important to "synchronise"

the process of reforms in the military domain with positive processes in other areas of inter-state relations.

The following argument in favour of the seminar's speedy convocation was advanced: Much time is needed by the general staffs of CSC E states to make preparations for the discussion of concrete problems at the seminar, especially at a time when many parties to the negotiations are busy reassessing their doctrines. This is why it is necessary to reach agreement quickly on the terms of the seminar and to draw up its agenda.

The Soviet delegation has advanced several preliminary considerations, which boil down to the following: The problem of military doctrines has become particularly acute after the Warsaw Treaty military organisation was dissolved. The east European states are actively seeking new ways to ensure their national security, ranging from rapprochement with NATO to neutrality. In these conditions, the Soviet Union will also be guided by the national doctrine in shaping its defense policy. This doctrine will have to be amended correspondingly. It is planned, among other things, not only to perpetuate, but further increase its defensive orientation.

Furthermore, the changes that have now occurred suggest a basically new approach to the assessment of the only remaining European military alliance—NATO. This is why the Soviet side expects the bloc's leadership to grasp the new military-political situation on the continent and take measures to implement the concept of all-European security. The Soviet Union also believes it is high time to get down to the practical elaboration of defense sufficiency criteria. Further promotion of the European disarmament process is unthinkable without them.

Military Districts Create Disarmament Departments

LD0603140491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1200 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] New departments dealing with disarmament issues are being set up in staffs of military districts. This has been done in accordance with the Paris Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Colonel Zorin, the head of the Transcaucasus Military District, said the following on the work of such a department in Transcaucasus Military District: We must ensure the implementation of the treaty and create all envisaged conditions for its fulfillment. We will monitor the movement of military equipment and weapons both in the district and outside it, take account of weapons which are to be destroyed, and provide for the work of foreign delegations on the territory of the district. We will establish by every means the necessary contacts with councils of ministers, foreign and interior ministries, and committees of state security of Transcaucasus republics.

General Views Troop Withdrawal from FRG

AU0803144891 Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 6 Mar 91 p 11

[Interview with Lieutenant General Vladimir Grebenyuk, chief of the Political Administration of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, by Rainer Funke and Rene Heilig; place and date not given: "Plans for Troop Withdrawal Are Being Observed—Despite Many Obstacles"]

[Excerpt] [NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] The Western Group will withdraw 30 percent of its troops and staffs from Germany this year—will they all be withdrawn by sea?

[Grebenyuk] At the moment, we do not have any other choice because of the rigid Polish attitude. This could change, but so far there is has also been a lack of diplomatic support from the FRG Government. They say that this is our problem. The plans for troop withdrawal will be fulfilled in line with the treaty, regardless of the obstacles that may arise. The personnel will be transported by plane anyway, the technical equipment will be transported by sea. Of course, this means additional costs—in financial, material, and organizational terms. Originally, we proceeded on the premise of transportation by land.

The sea route is much longer. Let us imagine: Our troops stationed in Neuruppin will be transferred to the Ukraine. Via Poland they would be practically close by. Now we are forced to transfer our troops to Mukran and Rostock, to load them on ships there, and then to take them to Leningrad by sea, and then take them from the north to the south. One can easily imagine how much more complicated that is. This is what I meant by referring to additional costs.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Thus, the tickets will be much more expensive. Would it not also be possible to go via the CSFR?

[Grebenyuk] Possible yes, but this presupposes corresponding negotiations and decisions. We are also withdrawing our troops from there.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Poland's Senate spokesman made the march through Poland dependent on the provision that before that all 50,000 Soviet soldiers have to be withdrawn from this country.

[Grebenyuk] Of course, one can pose conditions that are acceptable or unacceptable. The Polish side simply does not take some facts into account. The Soviet troops stationed in Poland must contribute their share to the withdrawal of the Western Group: material-technical supplies, medical care, and the regulation of the marching columns.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Soldiers and officers who have returned home from Hungary live in tents, their families in barracks. And now the Western Group is also on its way....

[Grebnyuk] You certainly get description from the mass media. I would like to propose that you visit these villages yourself. Whatever you have read or seen is very far removed from the truth. I do not want to play down the problems of accommodation. After all, 60 percent of our officers and warrant officers do not have housing in the USSR, but our government and the Defense Ministry are doing what they can. If soldiers still live in tents, this is not typical and will be only for a short period. This applies, above all, to those units that will be disbanded. Generally, the units stationed in the USSR take care of accommodation.

Life in tents is not abnormal for soldiers doing basic military service, for instance during training or exercises. Other units will be restructured or are waiting to be transferred to new garrisons. There are also so-called barracks that are suitable to live in.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] There is also a lack of kindergartens, schools, shops, services.... Jobs are scarce.

[Grebnyuk] Of course, there are problems with jobs and with the social and cultural infrastructure. This affects, above all, members of the soldiers' families, because there are locations that are a long way away from the places where there are jobs. These problems are not exclusively a result of the withdrawal, but they are complicated by it.

If you talk about these difficulties, please pay attention to the following fact: How many additional difficulties are our people accepting by fulfilling the treaty on withdrawal. If we had accepted the obligation to withdraw the troops by the year 2000, we would perhaps have houses instead of barracks, perhaps also those that are to be built with the money supplied by the FRG. But this year we will withdraw 150,000 people, including 15,000 officers and 10,000 warrant officers. None of them can move into a house that is to be built with means from the FRG. So far, not a single one has been built. Thus, we are accepting additional obligations. This creates additional problems. This should perhaps also be taken into account and should meet with understanding.

Our relations with the German side are not very smooth, either. Many procedures in the cooperation have not yet been clarified. This also applies to the use of the Soviet property.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] That is, the handing over or taking over of facilities?

[Grebnyuk] Yes. But also cooperation with the justice organs, the police, and others.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] But the FRG Government "only" decided on a Gulf war tax, not on a withdrawal tax for the Soviet Union. There seems to be no hope of getting more payments. But the things that the soldiers can expect at home certainly have an effect on the

morale of the troops. In Moscow the military demonstration in Red Square this time was not done in parade step. Were you there?

[Grebnyuk] No, I laid wreaths in honor of the dead in Berlin on Soviet Army Day. But the meeting in Moscow impressed me. It took place for the protection of the president and the protection of the unity of the state. Pereyaslavka is a complicated social experiment and the Army is not left out. Of course, we also have to admit mistakes in particular in the economy. This is used by pseudo-democrats, who pursue strange antisocialist goals. And they were rejected at the above-mentioned demonstration, particularly those people who are fanning hysteria against the Army under the cover of nationalist ideas. The Armed Forces will not let themselves be branded as the brakers of renewal. My thoughts were with the demonstrators in Moscow.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Colonel General Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group, has held many talks with German politicians over the past few days. However, only empty communiques were issued. What were the topics of the talks?

[Grebnyuk] The commander in chief met, for instance, with Stoltenberg and Admiral Wellershoff. He was in the Interior Ministry and in the Finance Ministry. He had talks in the Bundeswehr Command East. The issues were agreements concerning transportation, aviation rights over German territory, and unclear technical and financial questions. Of course, aspects emerged that require a topical clarification and mutual understanding. Comrade Burlakov thinks that this understanding and the readiness for constructive cooperation exist.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] If, in our interview, we want to go beyond any announcements that have been made so far, there arises the question: Why was Army General Snetkov, the previous commander in chief, replaced so suddenly? It could not have been because of two officers who defected with new weapons....

[Grebnyuk] Not suddenly—the desertion of the officers was only a coincidence in terms of time. That is why there were irritations. Comrade Snetkov is a very experienced, talented military man and enjoys the utmost respect in the Armed Forces. But he is also very old. Therefore, he repeatedly asked to be replaced, even before Germany's unification.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] But he was not an old general in Soviet terms. He was just 62. Now the Western Group also has diplomatic tasks. Does this yield an answer?

[Grebnyuk] We are, above all, soldiers, part of the Soviet Armed Forces, and not diplomats or tourists.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] In the east some German politicians feared that Soviet troops could invade the FRG. Now they have their position here. In a country that belongs to NATO. The military organization of the

Warsaw Pact no longer exists. Are you really still a functioning part of the Soviet Army?"

[Grebenyuk] Of course! We have to fulfill our tasks in line with the specific situation.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] That is, withdrawal?

[Grebenyuk] We will withdraw one-third this year. Two-thirds are not just waiting for the date of embarkation. There is training, and we must guarantee a certain level of combat capability. The specific conditions are another question. [passage omitted]

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] The Western Group leaves ecological problems.

[Grebenyuk] You may tell your readers that we are doing the utmost to minimize the damage. However, if you transfer a Bundeswehr unit, you will also find ecological problems at its former location. Many locations were already barracks of the German kaiser and the Wehrmacht. It is hard to say who caused more damage. However, the problem concerns both sides. We have to repair the damage together. We understand that and we are doing whatever is possible. [passage omitted]

British Prime Minister Major Visits Moscow

Discusses Proliferation, CFE With Gorbachev

PM0703134791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[M. Yusin report: "John Major: We Had An Intensive Dialogue; British Prime Minister's News Conference"]

[Excerpts] Having completed the program for his one-day working visit to Moscow, British Prime Minister John Major held a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists on the evening of 5 March.

The head of the British Government expressed satisfaction with the results of the trip. During the conversations with President Gorbachev (which lasted more than four hours, including a working dinner) there was a "detailed, sometimes very intensive, amicable discussion that produced useful results." [passage omitted].

Major stated with satisfaction that Moscow agreed with London's view on the need to restrict exports of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons to the Near East and keep a check on supplies of conventional armaments. When asked whether the Soviet Union had given any guarantees during the talks that it would not supply Iraq with any weapons at all, however, Major replied in the negative. [passage omitted].

The prime minister touched on the differences that exist between the two countries on questions connected with the treaty on conventional arms Major told Gorbachev and Defense Minister D. Yazov of "Britain's concern about the transfer of Soviet Army troop formations to new commands," which, in his opinion, is a violation of

agreements that have been concluded. The Soviet interlocutors presented their arguments. Major called the exchange of opinions useful but, to all appearances, the differences were not eliminated. [passage omitted].

Meets With Yazov, Military Aides

PM0703113591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

[Major M. Pogorelyy report: "Meeting in the Defense Ministry"]

[Excerpts] On 5 March British Prime Minister J. Major, who is on a brief working visit to Moscow, had a meeting with Soviet Defense Minister D.T. Yazov.

Describing the range of topics discussed, the USSR defense minister told journalists that attention focused on questions connected with the problems of implementing the treaty on conventional arms in Europe. The need for such a dialogue was dictated by the necessity to eliminate our sides' different understanding of questions of arms reduction. As Marshal of the Soviet Union, D.T. Yazov emphasized, the preparation of this treaty lasted more than three years. During this time the Soviet Union has withdrawn a large proportion of its troops from the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary and eliminated the "tank attack forces" previously concentrated there. The process of eliminating obsolete arms and commissioning new ones is taking place. All this was explained to the British side. [passage omitted]

Answering a question from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's reporter, British Prime Minister J. Major called the conversation very useful and productive and said that it had made it possible to ascertain more exactly the USSR's position on the problems discussed. J. Major also reported that he had invited Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, to pay an official visit to Britain.

Participating in the talks in the Defense Ministry were, on the Soviet side—Aviation Colonel General Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Air Force and USSR deputy defense minister; Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy and USSR deputy defense minister; Col. Gen. V.G. Denisov, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; and L.M. Zamyatin, USSR ambassador to Britain; on the British side—R. Braithwaite, British ambassador to the USSR.

Yazov Describes Meeting

LD0603231291 Moscow World Service in English
2000 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Excerpt] During his brief working visit to Moscow on 5 February [as heard], the British Prime Minister, John Major, had a meeting with the Soviet Defense Minister, Dmitriy Yazov, and some of the top military officials. At

the end of the meeting its participants were interviewed by our reporter, Aleksandr Yakovlev.

[Begin recording] [Yakovlev] There is nothing surprising about the desire of the prime minister, who had a very packed schedule, to meet representatives of the Soviet high military command. After all, too much in relations between states depends on the correlation of forces and the intentions of the sides in the military field. During the meeting the two sides discussed how consistent the Soviet Union was in its desire to cut its armed forces and armaments and curtail its military activities, the Soviet Union's idea about the role and place of the armed forces in the event of the emergence of a crisis situation, and what positions and how far the views of the Soviet military leadership disagreed with those of the British military department and the British leadership.

The situation in the Gulf area was also among the issues covered during the talks. The Soviet side declared that it was satisfied with the results of its talks with the British prime minister, who stressed his readiness to understand the position and arguments of the Soviet military leaders on questions under review, on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe above all. Marshal Dmitriy Yazov said the following:

[Yazov, in Russian, fading into English translation] The main issue under discussion, Marshal Yazov said, were matters relating to the negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe. The British have a certain misunderstanding concerning what we've done and are doing in that field, the marshal noted. We have no differences on this issue with the British, he added, but, Marshal Yazov went on, Britain's idea about the number of our weapons failed to correspond with what we have in reality.

That's why we tried to explain what steps we took towards reducing our arms and when. During the three year-long arms reduction negotiations, we've pulled out more than half of our troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We embarked on the elimination of what was termed as a so-called tank fist [as heard]. Where could we concentrate all this equipment? Naturally some of it we replaced and moved. We introduced most modern equipment and destroyed the old ones. We tried to explain all this in detail to the British side, Dmitry Yazov said. [passage omitted]

WGF Commander Briefs FRG Officials on Withdrawal Problems

PM0703150391 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda
in Russian 7 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Colonel V. Markushin report: "Meeting in Karlshorst"]

[Text] The Soviet garrison in Karlshorst was the venue for a meeting between plenipotentiary representatives of east German laender and the Bundeswehr's "East" territorial command and Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces.

The purpose of the meeting, as the commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces [WGF] defined it, was to brief the German side on the tasks facing the Soviet contingent in connection with its withdrawal from Germany. Maybe it is not worth dramatizing the fact that laender premiers, despite the invitation, refrained from participating personally in the meeting. Yet it will not be out of place to stipulate that personal contacts between the top people in this case would only have been of mutual benefit.

The attention of those present was drawn, above all, to such problems as the transit of Soviet troops across Poland and the cooperation between FRG law enforcement services and Western Group of Forces administrative organizations on the question of returning Soviet servicemen who have deserted to the West. In addition, the question of selling movable property and real estate, whose removal is unprofitable and hardly possible within the time allotted, was raised.

The discussion of the third problem proved the most detailed, and it will evidently be necessary to revert to it repeatedly. For now I will point out that there are approximately 40,000 apartments alone that belong to the Soviet side, including, incidentally, those that are now standing empty in military camps that have already been transferred to the German side's protection. In addition to the apartments, a huge number of other installations was constructed with Soviet money. You cannot quantify the total value down to the last kopek—they were constructed throughout the postwar years. This is why our economists name only an approximate figure of 10.5 billion marks.

Of course, there will be the costs of meeting the German side's claims; however, there is a possibility of obtaining real money and channeling it into constructing the same apartments for Soviet servicemen in the motherland. Here we have a right to count on the Germans' support: We have this right if only because we have a bilateral treaty and it must be fulfilled through joint efforts.

The representatives of the FRG laender and journalists were shown examples of property which is ready to be sold. Television and photographic cameras operated simultaneously, and there were many questions too. We will wait for the first trade deals.

Deputy Defense Minister on Property in FRG

LD0703120691 Moscow TASS in English 1102 GMT
7 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, March 7 (TASS)—Transfer of real estate that is the FRG's property and utilisation of buildings and structures built at Soviet expense for its forces in the FRG (the Western Group of Forces) remains difficult to

decide, Vladimir Arkhipov, Soviet deputy defence minister, logistics chief, told TASS today. He gave an interview in connection with the ratification of a package of treaties between the USSR and the FRG by Soviet parliament early this week.

Arkhipov said that by now the Soviet troops have turned over to the German side 844 facilities, 431 of them built at Soviet expense. Still the utilisation of property should be more effective, Arkhipov said. He believes that the buildings and structures transferred remain unused and gradually decay.

Arkhipov said that a joint Soviet-German commission decides on the composition, value and uses of real estate owned by the USSR. The commission has run up against some difficulties. "The German side has not yet worked out the procedure for the utilisation of this property", he said.

Arkhipov said the FRG raises the question about the compensation of its expenditures for the restoration and overhaul of structures and buildings used by the Western Group of troops, as well as for environmental improvement. There were also difficulties about settling questions of property of land on which these facilities are built.

The difference of approaches was manifested and it has not yet been possible to reach understanding, the general said.

In view of the need to settle all property and financial matters involved in the utilisation of Soviet real estate in the FRG, Arkhipov expressed the wish that the text of supplement to the treaty about troops, that would settle property questions, be drafted by the German side within a brief period of time.

Pact-NATO Consultative Group Discusses CFE Implementation

LD1103205491 Moscow TASS in English 1718 GMT
7 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, March 7 (TASS)—By ratifying the treaty on the final settlement of the German issue, the Soviet Union has greatly contributed to developing cooperation in Europe to the future, head of the German delegation at conventional arms in Europe [CFE] talks Ruediger Hartmann told a news conference here today.

The news conference was held after a plenary meeting of the joint consultative group of Warsaw Treaty and NATO experts, discussing the implementation of the conventional arms in Europe treaty.

Hartmann said the document is the main pier for the architecture of a new Europe aimed for cooperation.

Hartmann said the exchange of specified military data on the armed forces of the 22 member-states of the two

blocs within the consultative group was useful. He said there remained certain differences, but partners were trying to reach a consensus.

There are problems with placing three Soviet motorised infantry divisions under the command of the coast guard. Some delegations believe that by doing so, Moscow has violated its obligations on the treaty.

The Soviet side said this was done in 1989, i.e. a year before the treaty was signed, and it did not aim to violate the treaty. At the time, the issue of taking marines into account or exchanging such information had not been raised.

In addition, placing the divisions under the other command was a forced measure. After the Soviet Union considerably reduced its land forces' potential, NATO gained superiority in strike and mobile naval means. The Soviet Union was forced to protect coastal areas.

The Soviet Union said the coastal guard, like marines, is included in the navy, which is not being discussed at the Vienna talks.

Moiseyev in Poland To Discuss Troop Withdrawal, Transit

Churkin on Visit's Purpose

LD1103174291 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT
11 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Peskov]

[Excerpt] Moscow, March 11 (TASS)—[passage omitted] Asked about the purposes of the trip to Poland by Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, Churkin said that the trip is being made "within the context of a regular round of Soviet-Polish talks on the transit of Soviet troops being withdrawn from Germany and on the discussion of matters connected with the stay of Soviet troops that remain on Polish territory for the time being". A regular round of Soviet-Polish talks on these issues will be held in Moscow on March 19-20, Churkin announced. [passage omitted]

Meets With Foreign Minister

LD1103224891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1808 GMT 11 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Warsaw, 11 March (TASS)—Army General M.A. Moiseyev, Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, first deputy USSR minister of defense, arrived in the capital of Poland today on a two-day working visit. The Soviet military leader was received by Ksysztof Skubiszewski, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Poland. During the talks, the two sides discussed the issues of Soviet troops staying on the territory of Poland.

the periods for their withdrawal, the technical aspects of implementing this operating, and also the transit travel through Poland by the Soviet military contingent being withdrawal from the former territory of the GDR.

After the talks, M.A. Moiseyev stated to journalists that "good progress in ways of resolving these important problems took shape as a result of intensive dialogue."

Poles To Demand Payment

LD1203181991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 12 Mar 91

[Text] It is reported from Warsaw that Vice Admiral Kolodziejczyk, Polish minister of national defense, today received Army General Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and our country's first deputy defense minister. Comrade Moiseyev is in Warsaw in connection with talks about the transit of Soviet troops from Germany to the USSR, and also about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. I have just taken a DPA item from the teleprinter saying that, while talking to journalists, Army General Moiseyev said a final date for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland will be determined by the two countries' presidents—Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Lech Walesa. Everyone immediately concluded from this that such a meeting—rumors about it had already been circulating—was, in effect, receiving confirmation.

It is interesting to note one other factor. According to Army General Moiseyev, troops from Germany will be withdrawn by sea and by rail. We are unlikely to use Polish roads, and the reason is clear. The Polish side is demanding very steep payment.

Accord Reached

LD1203235491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1835 GMT 12 Mar 91

[Text] Warsaw, 12 March (TASS)—After the conclusion of his talks in Warsaw, Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, first deputy USSR minister of defense, told journalists that an accord has been reached on the start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops deployed on Poland's territory in April-May this year, which opens up an opportunity of establishing the maximum deadline for their withdrawal during the next few rounds of the Soviet-Polish talks, if the Polish side shows flexibility in this issue. If necessary, the date of the final withdrawal of Soviet troops can be fixed during the expected high-level Soviet-Polish meeting.

The Soviet side is satisfied with the organization of the sea transportation to the USSR of units of the Western Group of Forces to be withdrawn, and in connection with this it lays no claims to organizing a large-scale transit of Soviet troops through Poland. In particular, the necessity of using motor vehicle transport disappears: Limited-scale railway transportation is possible.

Shift of Infantry Divisions to Naval Forces Defended

LD1203095991 Moscow World Service in English 2000 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Commentary by military observer Captain Aleksandr Yakovlev]

[Text] Western countries have been voicing concern over the Soviet Union's intention to make three infantry divisions a part of its naval forces, which would place them beyond the bounds of the European Convention of Forces Treaty. The Soviet Union has been accused of violating the treaty. Radio Moscow's military observer, Captain Aleksandr Yakovlev, comments:

The Soviet Union has strictly honored its commitments to the unilateral reduction of armed forces and the withdrawal of its troops from Eastern Europe at an early date and the transition to a defensive military doctrine. The pace of these unprecedented steps is fast indeed. The Soviet Union is now as determined to reorganize the remaining ground troops along defensive lines.

Just recently I visited the Baltic military district. The number of tanks, still the main strike element, was reduced by 15 percent last year. Artillery pieces have been reduced by 40 percent; so have the calibers of guns and mortars. The quantity and quality of antitank weapons has remained unchanged. All this is evidence of defensive reorganization. Military exercises have become less frequent. In the first place they are devoted to practicing defensive operations and fostering anti-amphibious operation defenses on the coast.

The sharp reduction of armed forces, in particular ground troops, and the return home of big contingents, have posed a number of problems, such as accommodation and the elimination of a number of facilities and military equipment. Apparently these problems could be resolved in different ways, for instance (?the same package) [as heard] with the problems of other arms, including the Navy.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly suggested negotiations in order to reduce the naval forces of the sides and limit their activity. Unfortunately, its proposals were ignored. Apparently the United States and other allied countries are in no hurry to abandon their heavy superiority over the Soviet Union in the naval forces. The U.S. navy has 2.2 times more surface vessels, two times more aircraft and 10 times more marines than the Soviet Navy. Won't it be quite natural and reasonable for the Soviet Union to enhance the naval defense potential, in particular that of the coast, by including several ground units into the coast artillery forces as the Marines? Anyway, against the background of the United States' reluctance to make its naval forces liable to conventional arms reductions, such a step by the Soviet Union does not look like a violation of conventional forces treaty.

One more argument in favor of such a solution, which is ignored in many cases. The future of thousands of career servicemen and their families who would be directly affected by the reduction and the withdrawal of troops. It is clear that their interests cannot be neglected. Probably it is worse letting them serve their term once they have connected their lives with the Army.

Joint FRG Agreements on Troop Provisions Reported

LD120311589 Moscow TASS in English 1037 GMT 12 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, March 12 (TASS)—“A number of new agreements with German private and state firms followed the signing of a package of Soviet-German treaties. They were needed to provide Soviet troops with everything necessary.” Soviet Deputy Defence Minister Vladimir Arkhipov, who also heads the Soviet Armed Forces rear [services], told TASS.

According to Arkhipov, after the German unification, Soviet troops’ provision with various goods, services and transport facilities has considerably changed. “This is connected with the fact that such issues have been resolved not on the governmental level,” he said.

In accordance with the agreements, German authorities “guarantee regular provision of the Western army group with everything necessary”. Since the signing of the treaties, “there were no interruption with provisions on the part of Germany”, Arkhipov said.

Arkhipov said that in order to settle the disputable issues and differences connected with conditions of Soviet troops’ stay or withdrawal from German territory, a joint Soviet-German commission and a working group have been set up to ensure legal assistance and administrative cooperation.

Arkhipov recalled that the joint commission at its recent meeting discussed a range of issues. He said he was satisfied with the German side’s agreement to pay for transporting Soviet troops to the Soviet Union by sea in German ships.

The Germans had also agreed to help sell 200,000 tonnes of scrap metal and 300 tonnes of military and technical equipment, he said. Arkhipov noted that Germany agreed to “start discussions by the Western army group to set up a number of joint ventures using German V.” He said the agreement was useful and constructive.

“Soviet-German relations must be developed to build goodwill between the German population and our armies and Soviet troops. We must also show the positive aspects,” Arkhipov said.

120,000 Troops to Leave FRG in 1991

LD1203171491 Hamburg DPA in German 1624 GMT 12 Mar 91

[Text] Rostock (DPA)—A total of 120,000 Soviet soldiers and 30,000 civilians are to leave Germany and return to their homeland this year. According to the Rostock Senate today, 48,000 soldiers from Saxony-Anhalt and 35,000 from Brandenburg are to start their homeward journey via the Baltic ports of Rostock and Mukran during the next few weeks. The withdrawal of the approximately 400,000 Soviet Army personnel from former GDR territory is to be concluded by the end of 1994.

The senate spokesman further stated that the Soviet Army’s property in the former GDR, valued at 10.3 billion marks, is to be put up for sale. The proceeds are to be used to meet the costs of refuse disposal and clearing up damage to the environment in the garrisons. Because the money will probably not be sufficient, the federal minister of finance has stated his readiness to make interim resources available until 30 June. Afterwards the local authorities will probably be “asked to pay up.”

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Far East Expert Calls Korean NFZ ‘Basic Policy’
SK2302091391 Seoul YONHAP in English 0831 GMT 23 Feb 91

[Text] Seoul, February 23 (OANA-YONHAP)—Making the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] is one of the Soviet Union’s basic policies, and negotiations are actively under way with experts from the United States, Japan and China, a leading Soviet scholar said Saturday.

Mikhail Titarenko, director of the Institute of Far Eastern Affairs at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, told a press conference here that South Korea’s economic experience will be helpful to Moscow. [passage omitted]

When asked whether the Korean Peninsula can be made into a non-nuclear region, Titarenko said it is one of the basic policies of the Soviet Union and is highly possible.

“There has not yet been inter-governmental talks on the issue, but the matter will naturally come up during discussions for establishing an Asia-Pacific cooperation conference, which is to be held in N. Korea and Mikhail Gorbachev is to attend the conference, according to Asia,” Titarenko said. [passage omitted]

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Ambassador to South Korea Backs Military Balance Talks

Proposes Disarmament Body

SK2602035391 Seoul Domestic Service in Korean
0200 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] Sokolov, Soviet ambassador to the ROK, proposed to form a consultative body of experts [chon-munga hyobuiche] from nations concerned, including North and South Korea, the United States, and the Soviet Union, in order to discuss the issue of military balance on the Korean Peninsula.

Ambassador Sokolov made this proposal at a breakfast lecture meeting today that was arranged by the Research Institute for U.S. and Soviet Studies in Danguk University. He stressed that the Soviet Union is ready to participate in constructive discussion of a balanced reduction of armed forces in the Northeast Asia.

Ambassador Sokolov said that the Soviet Union believes that in spite of the suspension of the 4th North-South high-level talks, dialogue between the North and the South will be resumed at an early date based on goodwill and common sense. He emphasized again that the issue of the Korean Peninsula should be settled through dialogue and negotiations between the concerned parties of the North and the South.

Concerning the issue of economic cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union, Ambassador Sokolov noted that the ultramodern technology in military logistics in the Soviet Union, which recently began to be open to the public, will be usefully utilized in scientific and technological cooperation with the Republic of Korea. He revealed that cooperation between the two nations in the ultramodern science and technology sectors, including aviation technology, will be further increased.

'Ready' for Confidence-Building Steps

SK2602062091 Seoul YONHAP in English 0600 GMT
26 Feb 91

[Text] Seoul, February 26 (OANA-YONHAP)—The Soviet Union is ready to take specific confidence-building steps on the Korean Peninsula and to transfer advanced technology to South Korean industry, Soviet Ambassador to South Korea Oleg Sokolov said Tuesday.

Sokolov, addressing a breakfast meeting sponsored by the Center for American and Soviet Studies, said it was untrue that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev would visit Seoul in April but that Gorbachev had accepted President No Tae-u's invitation. He also registered personal concern that the solution sought for the Gulf war should not become the international standard of conduct for future conflicts.

In his first public lecture since taking up his post as the first Soviet ambassador here in December, Sokolov stressed the need for continued "intra-Korean dialogue." "Given the current suspension of the dialogue at the level of prime ministers, the Soviet Union expresses the hope that in the final analysis good will and common sense will prevail and lead to an early resumption of dialogue at all levels," he said.

Warming Soviet-U.S. relations, in which they view each other not as adversaries in Europe or Asia, should have a positive effect on the Korean situation, he said in the address entitled "USSR-ROK (South Korea) Relations: A Head-Start."

"My country is prepared to actively contribute to making such (favorable international) environment and interact for that purpose with other states. This certainly includes the Republic of Korea," he said. "Why not start expert-level consultation, for example, on military balance in the peninsula?"

The ambassador also spoke of the economic aspects of Seoul-Moscow ties.

"There is one particular area of cooperation where our two countries seem to be especially attracted to each other. It is the area where Soviet advanced technologies and fundamental research can be complimented by the capability and experience of Korean firms to put them to practical use," he said. "In addition, I would like to draw your attention to the huge scientific and technological potential of the Soviet military-industrial complex."

Answering questions after his lecture, Sokolov denied that Gorbachev plans to extend his Japanese visit in April to Korea.

Asked about the 1983 downing of a Korean jetliner by a Soviet fighter, the diplomat reiterated his government's regrets. There is already an agreement between the two countries to notify each other of any new facts and both sides should wait for the results of the investigation, which is now in progress.

Sokolov also expressed regret that a chance for peace before a ground war in the Gulf was missed and said the Soviet proposal included Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Expressing personal concern over what he called a very important issue, the ambassador said the solution sought for the Gulf crisis should not become the future international standard of conduct or a guideline.

Yazov Discusses Troop Cuts Along Chinese Border

OW2702192591 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 0100 GMT 27 Feb 91

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Answering Radio Moscow special correspondent Plevakho's questions on 26 February, Marshal Yazov highlighted the following: [passage omitted]

Yazov discussed Soviet-Chinese relations in detail. Our station's special correspondent Plevakho said: There is much speculation about your upcoming visit to China. I would like to ask about this. What role will the military play in the development of Soviet-Chinese relations? From your perspective, has the stabilization of Soviet-Chinese relations been felt throughout the entire Asia-Pacific region's military and political spectrum?

Marshal Yazov said: I think that our relations with China, military relations included, influence the stability of all Southeast Asia. We must bear in mind that the Soviet Union and China are two big nations and play a decisive role in many issues. We must mention that China is currently making several fundamental decisions in order to substantially reduce the strength of its own armed forces. For our part, we have also done a lot to let the Chinese people see that we have no intention of invading their territory. We have replaced infantry units on camels with permanent machine gun and artillery divisions; these are not able to make moves on the Soviet-Chinese border. We see that the Chinese side is taking similar measures. The Soviet defense minister said: We believe that our relations are normal. [passage omitted]

Moscow Radio Interviews Yazov on Upcoming Visit

OW0103125891 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 0700 GMT 1 Mar 91

[Announcer-read report on interview with USSR Minister of Defense Dmitriy Yazov by special correspondent Plevakho; place, date not given; from the "Asian Affairs" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, one of the issues discussed during an interview with Marshal Yazov, USSR minister of defense, by Radio Moscow's special correspondent Plevakho, was the development of Soviet-Chinese relations and its influence over the situation in the region.

Plevakho said: A great deal already has been discussed about your forthcoming visit to China. With regard to

this fact, people still raise such questions as the following: What kind of contribution can a soldier make to developing Soviet-Chinese relations? In your opinion, does the stability of Soviet-Chinese relations have any influence over the military and political situation in the Asia-Pacific region?

Yazov said: We think that our relations with China include the military sphere and that they do play a role in stabilizing the whole situation in eastern Asia because the USSR and China are two superpowers, and as such, many things depend on their stands. It should be pointed out that recently China decided on some important policies concerning reducing their armed forces. In order to show the Chinese that we will not start an offensive, we also have done a great many things in this regard. We have withdrawn our motorized infantry divisions from the border areas, where now only machine gun artillery divisions fixed at the firing point are deployed. It is hard for troops so deployed to push ahead in an assault. We noticed the Chinese side also took similar actions.

The defense minister said: I believe our relations are normal. Incidentally, I would also like to talk about my upcoming China visit. At present, we have a very tight work schedule because we are withdrawing our troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany, and Poland. In spite of our present heavy workload, we have reached an agreement with the Chinese side, through consultation, on my coming visit to China in March. By the way, I have never visited China before and so would like very much to see the living conditions of the People's Liberation Army of China and how they study. There is another fact that gives me reason for wanting to visit China, namely, we were once good friends in the past. For instance, I studied together with some Chinese in the (Voronezh) Military Academy. Guo Moruo, Zhu De, and other famous Chinese figures attended our academy. We were at odds with each other later on. We have been having fairly good contacts with each other since Gorbachev's visit to China.

Soviet Defense Minister stressed that, taking Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan into consideration, we definitely will be able to achieve important political successes in the Asia-Pacific region.

FRANCE

European Security in Wake of Gulf War

91ES04604 Paris *LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS*
in French 4 Feb 91 p 15

[Article by Romain Auberty, a high-ranking official
"Rethinking European Security"]

[Text] The crisis and war in the Gulf, though not yet over, have already done a great deal of damage and entailed considerable sacrifices. At the same time, they have already taught us many lessons. Let us list them, in no particular order: the major role of the United States, which is unrivaled in the rapidity of its military deployment and in the power of the human and material resources it can bring to bear; the need, when it comes to defense, for a diversified gamut of armaments; the extreme weakness, both politically and militarily, of the European Economic Community; the loyalty of Great Britain and France to their traditions and to what they represent; the divisions of the Arab and Muslim world; the mistakes of the PLO leadership; the self-control of the Israeli Government; the fearsome dangers of chemical and nuclear proliferation...

"Patriot" Lesson

The most unexpected but probably most obvious lesson concerns the Patriots. These short and medium range antimissile systems have played a fundamental role in the conduct of the war. They have made it possible, so far at least, to avert both Israeli intervention in the war, with all the consequences that could entail, and resort to reprisals.

The U.S. President, in his State of the Union message, immediately used their success as a justification for further development of Ronald Reagan's SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative). It will be recalled that many were skeptical of this ambitious "initiative," regarding its vision of a world without nuclear weapons as a pipe-dream. Today it seems clearer that the intuition behind it rested on a more solid foundation: The fact that the Vietnam experience had left the collective psyche of Western Europe and the United States with deep-seated misgivings about what the Vatican calls the primitiveness of war.

Public reaction today to the military victims of a conflict is quite different from what was seen in World War I and World War II, different even from the more recent reactions to carnage in the decolonization period (12,000 French soldiers killed in Algeria!).

We are going to see a "refocusing" of the Star Wars program. Future efforts to build a European defense will not be able to ignore that technological aspect of modern security. If we consider not only the direct ramifications of the Gulf crisis but also the continuing uncertainties about Russian policy—even now, with five years of

Gorbachevism behind us—it is clear that world events in the first weeks of 1991 offer inexhaustible food for thought.

1985-89: Improvisation

European governments and the United States should first of all take a sincere look at the way they dealt with security problems from 1985 to 1989, even though that era now seems to have been superseded in many respects. We must admit forthrightly that Western thinking during those years was primarily characterized by improvisation.

Beginning in early 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev pursued policies that were both dynamic and audacious. He quit trying to intimidate the West, and his confidence-building efforts and unilateral initiatives embarrassed governments that were still locked into ideas inherited from the era of Brezhnev. We recall, for example, the Reykjavik summit of October 1986: Never had the Russians and Americans been so close to a disarmament agreement. A treaty providing for the simultaneous withdrawal of the Euromissiles (INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces]) installed in Europe—namely the Soviet SS-20's and the American cruise missiles and Pershing II's—was within reach. In February 1987, the Soviets and Americans began negotiations on an INF agreement (the first zero option). At the same time, the Western governments found themselves embarrassed by the Soviets' subsequent offer to give up their short range (500-1,000 km) missiles.

Everyone knew that if the United States accepted the second zero option, the only nuclear-tipped arms remaining in Central Europe would be weapons with a range of less than 500 km (SNF, or very short-range nuclear forces). In other words, weapons that were situated in the territory of the two Germanys and unable to reach any other countries. The Americans and the English, in accepting the second zero option, intended to remain intransigent regarding the possibility of reduction or nonmodernization of these very short-range weapons (third zero option). Their position outraged the German public and led to a quarrel with the FRG within the Atlantic alliance. Not once was there serious discussion of the fundamental question of whether it was really necessary to maintain nuclear warheads on European soil. The Western countries, rightly dazzled by Gorbachev's reformism, erred from a security point of view by falling victim to these divisive ploys—"salami" tactics, as the Italian Communists like to call them.

Americans Necessary

Today, in the aftermath of the 1989 events, the very short-range missiles are capable of reaching only friendly, democratic countries, i.e. the liberated countries of Central Europe. Ironically, we might be better off if the zero option question had been resolved in precisely the opposite fashion: The only missiles now employable

against a newly expansionist Russia would be cruise missiles and Pershing II's with a range of 500 km.

It is tempting, in face of the rapid democratization of Central Europe, to nourish illusions about the uselessness of an American nuclear force in Europe, particularly now that the Soviet Union is in the process of reducing its conventional forces in accordance with the November 1990 agreement. But the USSR still has 13,000 nuclear warheads based on European soil. Even if the START accord on American and Soviet strategic weaponry (scheduled for conclusion at the February 1991 summit) were finally signed, Russia would still have more than 6,000 nuclear warheads. Unless we are content to rely solely on sea-based strategic deterrence (submarines and surface ships), is it not essential to consider the deployment in Europe of an air force equipped with a nuclear air-to-ground missile capable of reaching Russian territory? But is such a deployment politically possible? And are we not here facing the problem of a fourth zero option, the only one which is still conceivable—one, moreover, which indirectly would restore the balance of intermediate nuclear forces (INF)? As one can see, the stakes are high and should not be underestimated. One need only consider the potential for destabilization posed by a country like Iraq to get some idea of the threat that a nondemocratic Russia, with all its modern weaponry, could pose for Europe. Without a significant American presence, Europe would be doomed to powerlessness. And in event of politico-military confrontation, the United States—lacking an adequate panoply of military options—might perhaps have to resort to strategic weapons, which could lead to global war.

Once again, it is not that we hold doubtful the survival of much of the democratic gains Gorbachevism has brought. It is just that a coherent and cautious security policy still seems indispensable. Indeed, even Germany's defense minister has recently concluded that NATO needs to be strengthened.

Alliance Revision

A rather lengthy transition period will be required before we can expect a purely European defense. Even if British and French nuclear forces are not threatened by the Soviet-American disarmament process, they are not at present integrated into a conventional force adequate to cope with any conceivable crisis. The American presence, therefore, is necessary. The question that has been left hanging since the Reykjavik summit—whether or not that presence should include a nuclear component on European soil—is still unanswered. It is a difficult question, one that demands much reflection. Assuming anti-missile systems need to be developed, who gets the contract? How can the evident concern of the new Central European democracies for their own protection be integrated into defense policy? And how will Germany respond to these problems?

Many questions remain unanswered at present. Given the new realities of the security situation in Europe and

around the world, a return to square one—and consequently a rethinking of the whole concept of the Atlantic alliance—seems unavoidable. And, apart from European territory, we must reconsider the question of the alliance's geographic extension. We have just seen in the Gulf crisis that independent, autonomous action by a limited force is not viable in a military situation where one power clearly dominates all the others by virtue of its commitment in material and human assets.

It would thus appear, if this reasoning is valid, that of all the countries in the alliance, the one that should have the honor of taking the first steps to promote a general review of European and Western security problems is none other than France.

GERMANY

Daimler-Benz CEO Defends Sales to Iraq

91GE0146B Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
28 Jan 91 p 17

[Interview with Edzard Reuter, Daimler-Benz CEO, by DER SPIEGEL editors Wolfgang Kaden and Dietmar Hawranek; place and date not given: "The Policymakers Must Decide"]

[Excerpt] [DER SPIEGEL] Now that the Gulf War is on, Mr. Reuter, all those in Europe who for years delivered weapons to countries such as Iraq are being criticized. Do you feel you are a target of the criticism?

[Reuter] No, in no way whatever. We exported with the full knowledge of the responsible political figures and within the framework of legal regulations—and nothing else.

[DER SPIEGEL] Iraq for example took delivery of 4,564 Milan missiles and 1,050 Roland antiaircraft missiles via France's Euromissile company, 50 percent of which is owned by MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm], a Daimler subsidiary. Everything in order?

[Reuter] Do you recall when that was? It occurred at a time when it was considered politically—I stress: politically—desirable to assist Iraq militarily in its war against Iran.

[DER SPIEGEL] The avenue via French partners is a favorite of German arms manufacturers such as MBB in order to circumvent the German ban on arms exports to areas of tension.

[Reuter] This constitutes a real problem which worries us ourselves. We have no European guidelines on the export of defense materials. But there is no major European defense technology project that does not involve European cooperation. That is why we have been fighting for some time now for the formulation of a uniform export policy in this field. Hopefully the conflict with Iraq will once again demonstrate to those responsible that one is urgently needed.

[DER SPIEGEL] The business sector likes to shift the responsibility onto the policymakers. Can the managers really wash their hands of it?

[Reuter] Of course they cannot do that as citizens of a country. They have an opinion of their own on this.

[DER SPIEGEL] ...they are the suppliers of this stuff.

[Reuter] Sure. But they are not the ones who make the fundamental decisions. An individual manufacturer simply cannot pass judgment on whether a given country is capable of defense. We can state an opinion, but it is the policymakers who must decide.

[DER SPIEGEL] Let us go back to the case of the defensive missiles that were produced jointly with the French. For years there has been a sort of gentleman's agreement that has the Germans taking care of the clean exports and the French handling the dirty ones—with everyone profiting from this division of labor.

[Reuter] That is simply not true. What do you mean by clean and dirty exports?

[DER SPIEGEL] Clean exports go to NATO countries; dirty exports go to regions of tension.

[Reuter] That may be the case. But let me say it again. Then we here in the FRG, from the very start, should not have participated in the production of such defense material, on the basis of our political history. After all, the governments were aware of the situation from the outset. Bonn even considered permitting the sale of German armor to Saudi Arabia. You cannot blame the participating companies for that.

[DER SPIEGEL] We have no intention of whitewashing the policymakers. We are merely saying that the business sector was not pushing for clear-cut regulations because the gray area provided such marvelous opportunities for making sales.

[Reuter] If there was anyone who called for clear-cut decisions in this connection, it was our company. We do this much more outspokenly than the media and, I might add, Daimler-Benz has only been operating in this field in any appreciable way for a relatively short time.

[DER SPIEGEL] Daimler-Benz delivered trucks to the Iraqi army even before the acquisition of MBB.

[Reuter] Correct. But we did not deliver any armored trucks to anyone, but only normal civilian trucks. It was and is known that these trucks were used to transport troops but I do not think anyone can be blamed for that. All of these exports, too, were covered by German law in full awareness of all the circumstances.

[DER SPIEGEL] You knew that the trucks were being delivered to the military.

[Reuter] Yes, of course we did. We were supplying arms quite openly—within the bounds of legal and political regulations, nothing else.

[DER SPIEGEL] As a businessman, do you feel the policymakers are leaving you in the lurch?

[Reuter] There is no economic issue in the FRG that is shot through with more hypocrisy, cowardice, and opportunism than arms exports. The policymakers play a major role in this.

[DER SPIEGEL] So do the manufacturers. MBB, for example, maintains that the BK 117 and BO 105 helicopters delivered to Iraq are earmarked for the transportation of VIPs and for rescue missions. Quite obviously these helicopters were later refitted as military helicopters.

[Reuter] To my knowledge a very small number of helicopters were indeed delivered to Iraq. It is a problem that the manufacturers are sometimes inclined to minimize things that ought to be stated openly. Openness with regard to this issue is more indispensable today than it may have been in the past. Our company is making every effort to prevent such mistakes from recurring in the future.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are calling for Europe-wide regulations on arms exports. What should they look like?

[Reuter] My personal view on this is quite clear. Europe-wide regulations should parallel the existing German regulations.

[DER SPIEGEL] Who should control that?

[Reuter] If the German model were to be adopted by the EC, the sovereignty of the individual countries would have to pass over to Brussels or to a separate regulatory authority—a new agency to be created for this purpose.

[DER SPIEGEL] To be sure, the German model is not that impressive. Do you have any clear idea as to how weapon export controls could be improved upon in Germany?

[Reuter] By now, the controls are stricter than they were. As of 1990, the managements of the participating companies must name a specific individual responsible for arms exports who is personally accountable for mistakes. Here at Daimler-Benz we have a regulation which goes beyond the law. It states that the entire board must ultimately make the decision in every case of doubt regarding these exports. One cannot establish a more effective failsafe system in a company than the one we have.

[DER SPIEGEL] Shouldn't illegal arms exports be subject to more severe punishment?

[Reuter] I have no objections to that.

[DER SPIEGEL] What do you think the chances are that the Europeans will agree on effective export controls? In France or England hundreds of thousands of jobs are tied to these sales.

[Reuter] I am not that pessimistic in this regard. The jobs are less of an obstacle than the unwillingness to transfer sovereignty to supranational agencies.

[DER SPIEGEL] You once said that there ought to be "strict moral limits" on export deals. What are they?

[Reuter] Clearly exports should not go to countries about which there is the least doubt regarding their political reliability. We cannot clandestinely deliver weapons to some petty princes who are preparing for wars somewhere. In my view that is immoral.

[DER SPIEGEL] That seems too general to us. Iraq is a good case in point of how fast political opportunities change. Must one not draw the conclusion from this experience that arms should no longer be exported to all these countries?

[Reuter] Although most people have since repressed the fact, Iraq was deliberately supplied with military material on the basis of government decisions until a very short time ago...

[DER SPIEGEL] ...the political decision need not have been the correct one.

[Reuter] Let me go down the list: the USSR did it; the French government did it. All of this was done with the knowledge of the United States. It was paid for with, among other things, Saudi Arabian money...

[DER SPIEGEL] ...and with Kuwaiti money.

[Reuter] That is so. So do not know make it out now as though the military conflict in the Gulf was principally brought about by German arms sales.

[DER SPIEGEL] We did not say that.

[Reuter] But it is being done to a very large extent in German public opinion.

[DER SPIEGEL] The most terrible weapons, to be sure, do come from Germany.

[Reuter] What are they?

[DER SPIEGEL] The chemical weapons.

[Reuter] You are probably just as little aware of how those plants there came into being.

[DER SPIEGEL] We know a great deal about them. And we have written a lot about this.

[Reuter] That may be. But Daimler-Benz was not a part of it.

[DER SPIEGEL] An unequivocal decision might state that military equipment may only be sold to NATO countries.

[Reuter] That might be a possibility. But let me repeat: The main thing is that a Europe-wide decision is reached. But there also is a need to debate the issue of

what responsibilities the Western community is actually willing to assume to maintain world peace in the future. Do we really intend to burden our American friends with the role of world policeman? Or must we not conduct a fundamental debate on the question of how peace-keeping policies can be distributed among several nations? Let us not make believe that someone will not appear in some corner of the world and disturb the peace and commit acts of violence.

[DER SPIEGEL] Must the united Germany make a stronger commitment?

[Reuter] I am firmly convinced that there is no other way. But the Germans must act within the bounds of a community, of NATO or the United Nations.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the United States above all people are saying that the Germans are exporting military equipment without any scruples. How do you assess the harm done by the illegal exports to Libya or Iraq?

[Reuter] It is obvious that the transgressions of individuals have caused great harm. [passage omitted]

Economics Minister on Arms Exports Controls

91GE0157A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
11 Feb 91 pp 104-105, 107

[Interview with Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann, by Paul Lersch and Heiko Martens; place and date not given: "The Erosion Is Continuing"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [SPIEGEL] Before you can implement your great strategies, you of all people must deal with the subject of arms exports.

[Moellemann] Why me of all people?

[SPIEGEL] Have you not promoted all the business deals with the Arab states?

[Moellemann] I have advocated security cooperation with and weapons exports to Saudi Arabia, just as Helmut Schmidt did. And I was not wrong in doing so, as shown by the threat to Saudi Arabia from Iraq.

[SPIEGEL] You are known as a person who, in his time as minister of state in the Foreign Ministry, for example, urged diplomats to promote export deals of all kinds....

[Moellemann] Yes, the diplomatic service must also take seriously the interests of the German economy in legal exports to the entire world; that has now been understood in the Foreign Ministry as well.

[SPIEGEL] And now you want to curb exports?

[Moellemann] The firms must adhere to the decisions of the export permit authorities where it is a matter of goods that require a permit. I will abide by this.

[SPIEGEL] Permits are given by government officials and they must have some idea of what their chief is

thinking. What are they then to think of you, who as president of the German-Arab Society takes pride in especially good contacts with Iraq?

[Moellemann] First of all, I have given up my chairmanship because of the greatly increased work load that I now have and I have asked one of my deputies to take over the work until the next annual assembly, when the regular elections will take place.

[SPIEGEL] You will no longer be a candidate?

[Moellemann] That is simply impossible because of my work load. But I will continue to be active in this society and speak out for German-Arab cooperation. And the task for my officials is to support everything that is undeniably a civilian export. And that is certainly more than 17 million out of 18 million export proceedings. As for everything that belongs in the military and gray zone: check it out very carefully and deal with it according to regulations.

[SPIEGEL] Here everything is allowed that is not forbidden. In the case of the Americans, in principle every export requires approval. What do you think about this?

[Moellemann] That has now changed somewhat. Both systems have converged. I do not expect any more opposition to the changes in the law that have now been passed. For the shock of a possible useful use of gas against Israel has hit not only politicians hard but also responsible people in the economy.

[SPIEGEL] German firms develop weapons with the French or English, who export without Bonn being able to exert any influence. After the most recent experiences, do you still consider this kind of cooperation to be reasonable?

[Moellemann] This cooperation in the alliance lowers unit costs. A Tornado cannot be financed and built by one nation. In addition, cooperation in weapons technology serves standardization in NATO. It is necessary to have common objectives for exports.

[SPIEGEL] Will you ever achieve them?

[Moellemann] One must come to an agreement in the alliance that weapons exports outside NATO can take place only when a foreign-policy and security interest can be determined jointly. I could also imagine the introduction of additional criteria such as the question of the internal stability and democratic orientation of states. A decisionmaking body, possibly under NATO, should then decide in specific cases.

[SPIEGEL] And you believe that the French and English will go along with this?

[Moellemann] That will certainly not be easy. But when in the near future the American, French, and British soldiers are subjected to the fire of their own weapons, the delivery of which to Iraq was approved by their own

governments, then this will evoke a very critical discussion there as well. [passage omitted]

Defense Minister Details Bundeswehr Reorganization

AU2702152091 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Feb 91 p 5

[“F.Y.” report: “Stoltenberg: Soviet Union Violates Vienna Agreement”]

[Text] Bonn, 26 February—The Bundeswehr will consist of two parts in the future. One part will be comprised of only soldiers who are ready to participate in military operations outside Germany, and the other part will include the other units in which “normal” conscripts are doing military service. As a matter of fact, as in the past, those units can basically also be deployed outside Germany, on the territory of other NATO countries, for example. However, that is not likely to happen.

This was announced by Defense Minister Stoltenberg in Bonn on Tuesday [26 February]. Referring to the ratification of the Vienna agreement on conventional weapons, the defense minister pointed out that the Soviet Union violated the treaty by integrating three divisions that had belonged to the ground forces into the Navy instead of dissolving them. Together with its allies, the Federal Government believes that this behavior is a breach of the treaty. Talks in Vienna are currently concentrated on the correction of the Soviet decision. It is an essential precondition for “a quick and general ratification of the agreement, in which we are interested,” the defense minister stated.

Asked about new plans for the Bundeswehr, which have become necessary because of the reduction of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 men, Stoltenberg stressed that a decision about the future closure of locations will finally be made in July. Before that, the laender affected by the decision will be consulted. As a result of the reduction of the Bundeswehr in the western laender from 490,000 to 320,000 men, the number of corps and divisions will also be reduced.

Changes in the Structure

Since early warning periods will become longer as a result of detente in the government's view, the structure of the Bundeswehr should be changed as well. Above all, it means that the field army and the territorial army and their staffs will be combined. The corps staffs are to be merged with the three existing territorial commands in the old FRG. A merger is also planned at the leadership level of the military district commands and the division staffs. The 12 existing divisions will be reduced to eight. In addition, there will be two division commands, as they existed in the past.

The two additional division commands are necessary for unforeseen leadership tasks. The 48 brigades of the old Bundeswehr will be reduced to 28 in the old laender, and

six additional motorized infantry regiments will be established. The defense kreis commands will be incorporated into the defense bezirk commands, which means that they will no longer be independent authorities. The Luftwaffe airborne combat units will be reduced by one-third. The land-based air defense will largely be reduced to cadre personnel. The Navy will be reduced by 50 percent to 90 ships by the end of the decade.

Stoltenberg announced that there are also plans to reduce the Defense Ministry. In that connection, tasks that have so far been fulfilled by the ministry will be transferred to high-level command authorities, to offices and authorities of the Bundeswehr administration. That applies both to the military services and the sphere of armament. The Bundeswehr administration, where civilians are employed, will also be reduced. Of the existing 170,000 jobs, 26,000 will be eliminated by the end of the decade. Layoffs are not planned, but there will certainly be transfers.

Referring to the future structure of the Bundeswehr, the minister pointed out that only a few mobile units that can be used at short notice will exist after the middle of the decade. The remaining units will be reduced to cadres. Units that are destined for deployment outside Germany will include, besides professional soldiers and long-term servicemen, only conscripts who "volunteer to join the units and thus decide to participate in operations outside Germany," the minister stressed. However, he did not elaborate what will happen if the number of conscripts volunteering to join such units is insufficient.

The so-called core of the old Bundeswehr of 89,600 professional soldiers and officers who have signed up for military service for a specific period of time is to be reduced to 78,500. The number of soldiers who sign up for between four and 15 years of service will be slightly reduced. It will drop from 145,800 to 115,500. However, the number of volunteers who serve only two years will decline from 16,800 to 5,000. The number of those doing compulsory military service will be reduced from 208,000 to 145,000. It was striking that in his statements Stoltenberg referred to the old Bundeswehr in the former FRG. In his plans the minister generally made a distinction between Bundeswehr West and Bundeswehr East, thus making it clear that a merger of the old Bundeswehr and the units resulting from the former GDR National People's Army is not planned in the foreseeable future.

[Text]

Continuing Disarmament

Mentioning difficulties that have arisen in connection with the Vienna arms control talks since the fall of last year, the defense minister stressed that the Federal Government is willing to continue the arms control process, to open a second round of talks in Vienna, and to negotiate over the reduction of the chemical weapons that still exist in Europe in the near future. Referring to the two-plus-four treaty on German sovereignty, which also includes the agreement on the deployment and

withdrawal of Soviet troops, the minister stated that there are indications that the treaty will be ratified by the competent Soviet bodies, and that the troops will be withdrawn according to schedule.

Stoltenberg described the fact that the Soviet Union simply transferred 57,000 weapons systems covered by the Vienna disarmament treaty behind the Urals as "not really compatible" with the spirit of the agreement. A clarification of that issue is being sought in Vienna. Bonn and its allies view the fact that three divisions with weapons systems covered by the Vienna agreement, which were so far part of the ground forces, have been incorporated into the naval forces in Leningrad—which means that they no longer fall under the Vienna agreement—as an obstacle to the ratification of the Vienna treaty.

Talks on confidence-building measures should be continued swiftly and concluded before the end of this year, Stoltenberg emphasized. Talks on nonstrategic weapons in Europe should also be opened this year. In that connection, a reduction, not the elimination, of such weapons should be discussed, the minister pointed out.

Further Reduction of Bundeswehr in East

AU1203102391 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 8 Mar 91 p 4

[ADN/"eb" report: "Bundeswehr in East Is Further Reduced"]

[Text] Dresden—The reduction of Bundeswehr strength in eastern Germany and the development of new structures has clearly made progress. Yesterday Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg expressed this view in front of journalists in Dresden. At the conclusion of a three-day visit to Saxony, he said that the objective is a socially acceptable troop reduction from about 90,000 to 50,000 men, 37,000 of whom will perform basic military service. According to the minister, the application of 23,000 officers and noncommissioned officers for permanent employment by the government is encouraging.

Inspector General on Bundeswehr Reform, NATO's Future

AU1203101991 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 12 Mar 91 p 6

[“fy” report: “Bundeswehr Reform Is Almost a New Start”]

[Text] Bonn, 11 March—The Bundeswehr will continue to be necessary for Germany's security in the future. This was pointed out by Inspector General Admiral Wellerhoff at the opening of the 32d Commander's Meeting in Bonn on Monday [11 March]. The positive development that led to German unity and to the end of the division of Europe does not change that. "No sensible person would remove the dam in front of his door as long as he

has to expect a flood," Wellershoff said. After reunification, the Bundeswehr is facing the most comprehensive reform since its founding. This reform is virtually a new start. The German Armed Forces are now responsible for protecting the entire fatherland. Their operations and service must be as natural in Hamburg and Ulm as in Berlin and Leipzig.

Wellershoff made some critical remarks about both the political discussion and the behavior of individual soldiers during the Gulf crisis. One cannot allow "some whining or materialistic voices of soldiers to damage the image of the Bundeswehr," the inspector general said. He then spoke of the "slanders statements in some of the print media of friendly states," which he rejected. Such statements are the result of the absurd discussion in Germany. Not only foreign observers gained the impression that the security policy consensus in Germany has been lost. Wellershoff criticized in particular the differentiation between "policy of power" and "policy of responsibility." "Power is not a contradiction to a policy of responsibility, but—understood correctly—it is one of its preconditions," the highest-ranking soldier of the Bundeswehr said. It was Foreign Minister Genscher, who, in a speech in the Bundestag a few weeks ago, came out against the pursuing of a "policy of power" and, instead, supported a "policy of responsibility."

The political education of an entire generation in Germany has suffered as a result of the fact that we have not yet come to terms with German history, Wellershoff said. This has led to a disturbed relationship "also with legitimate power." The Bundeswehr, too, must ask itself in a self-critical way whether it has succumbed to the tendency in our society to assess power as something generally evil. Thoughts of war, death, and injury have been thrust too far into the background. Officers who pointed out the importance of practical training for war were criticized publicly and politically, the inspector general said.

With regard to the international situation he added that, following the extremely positive developments of the past year, there has been a "cold shower" over the past few months. The irreversibility of the reforms in the Soviet Union has been called into question, the successes of arms control have not yet been set down in writing as regards the Vienna disarmament treaty. The Balkans is falling back into old ethnic conflicts, and developments outside Europe have made it clear that the world consists of more than just Europe. Precautionary measures require a security policy in which political, economic, and social, "but also military measures" have their proper place. The Soviet Union, from which the greatest uncertainty emanates, remains the most powerful military power in Europe, in whose "global nuclear shadow" the Germans have to continue to live. Therefore, in the future, too, NATO will be of vital importance for the security of Europe and North America. It is the only fully functioning instrument of collective defense and thus a guarantor of stability and security.

Wellershoff paid tribute to the efforts of the European states to achieve a common security policy. He said that the Western European Union (WEU) is particularly suited for that because it could assume the role of a bridge between the EC and NATO. At the same time, however, he warned that the WEU must not compete with NATO. The admiral discussed at length the Soviet Union's behavior as regards the treaty on conventional disarmament. It was signed last November. However, its speedy ratification is in danger because the Soviet Union wants to exclude three of its divisions from the disarmament in violation of the treaty by declaring them forces for guarding the coasts. In addition, it has transferred 57,000 weapons systems that fall under the treaty regulations behind the Urals; 36,000 units have been put in storage. This corresponds to the equipment of about 30 divisions. In doing this it did not expressly violate the text of the treaty but it did violate its spirit. The disquieting thing about this is not so much the scope of divergence from the treaty but the fact itself. A failure of the treaty might have unpredictable consequences for the further process of disarmament, which is currently stagnating, Wellershoff said.

Businessmen Charged With Selling CW Equipment to Iraq

LD1203155891 Hamburg DPA in German 1347 GMT 12 Mar 91

[Excerpts] Darmstadt (DPA)—The Darmstadt public prosecution has brought charges against 12 businessmen for illegal arms exports to Iraq. The accused are charged with having several times violated the foreign trade law. As a result, Iraq has been able to produce chemical weapons [CW], the public prosecutor's office announced on Tuesday.

Some of the accused also face charges of attempted fraud. They are said to have claimed damages from state authorities, claiming that their exports were banned unjustifiably and were thus prevented. Even so, the accused did export their goods. [passage omitted]

The background to the charges is the suspicion that Karl Kolb Company from Dreieich (Offenbach district) and its subsidiary Pilot Plant as well as other firms supplied Iraq with a "production and research plant for pesticides," which was actually used for the production of poison gas. The public prosecution's export, Swiss Professor Werner Richartz, after two years of examining the documents, reached the conclusion that the plant was "specially constructed" for the production of poison gas. [passage omitted]

NETHERLANDS

Stricter Technology Export Controls Sought

91EN0275A Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 8 Feb 91 p 12

[Unattributed article: "The Chamber Wants Stricter Arms Export Regulations"]

[Text] The Hague, 8 February—The Second Chamber yesterday once again called for stricter European legislation to prevent the export of technologically high-quality weaponry. The Netherlands Government should strongly support such a move within the EC context. Current legislation on the European and national level is inadequate.

The Gulf war shows where this situation can lead. It is "sad" that the allied troops there must "fight against weapons that they themselves exported," said PVDA [Labor Party] member of parliament Valk. CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] speaker Koffeman spoke in this regard of a "less than distinguished role by the Federal Republic [of Germany]." The CDA and PVDA wondered whether there should not be a nonproliferation treaty in order to counter the proliferation of missile technology.

All these points were brought up during a verbal consultation between Minister van den Broek and the Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee concerning the Fourth Review Conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPV) Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, held in Geneva in August and September.

The Chamber seemed pessimistic about the results of this conference, which is held every five years. At the conference, the United States and Great Britain refused to explicitly link further agreements on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to agreements on halting nuclear testing.

The attitude of the two major powers was criticized by all speakers. According to Koffeman (CDA), an extension of the NPV has been jeopardized. Valk (PVDA) said that the credibility of the West among Third World countries has decreased. Tommel (Democrats 66) criticized van den Broek, saying that the Netherlands is perhaps too understanding of the U.S. and British position.

"You can tell friends the truth, and the truth is that they are too sluggish," said Tommel. Van den Broek promised to urge both major powers "to consider this linkage seriously."

Country To Cut 40,000 Troops From Forces

LD0803141991 Hilversum International Service
in English 1130 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Text] The Dutch Armed Forces will be cut by 40,000 troops in the coming ten years. Dutch Defense Minister Relus Ter Beek, presenting his new defense plans, said that, due to a completely changed perception on world security, it has become necessary to remodel the Armed Forces. In future, he said, all military units must be able to perform a wide range of tasks in various divergent situations and under different circumstances; especially, the land forces will have to become more flexible in their operation. A new initiative within the Armed Forces has been the introduction of a flying mobile brigade. The

Armed Forces trade unions have rejected the proposals, saying they are deeply concerned about the planned personnel cuts. The trade unions have also indicated that, on crucial points, the defense plans are too vague.

SWITZERLAND

BLICK Reports Firms Exported CW Precursors to Iraq

91WC0069B Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE
in French 31 Jan 91 p 2

[Unattributed ATS article: "Switzerland Exported Poison Gas Ingredients"]

[Text] Bern, 30 January (ATS)—Swiss chemical firms sold Iraq substances that go into mustard gas and neurotoxins. Between 1981 and 1985 (if not for even longer), phosphorus oxychloride and thioglycol were among the products Switzerland exported to Iraq. Since 1987, these substances have come under the purview of the War Materiel Exports Act, but federal authorities refuse to say whether they authorized any deliveries.

According to the daily newspaper BLICK's Wednesday edition, 452 tons of phosphorus oxychloride were exported to Iraq between 1981 and 1985. This substance, used primarily for water chlorination and as an insecticide in industry, can also enter into the composition of neurotoxins. BLICK was told by Bernhard Brunner, an expert with the DMF [Federal Military Department]. During those same years, 14 tons of thioglycol [as printed], a product used in the manufacture of mustard gas, was also shipped to Iraq.

The General Directorate of Customs confirmed to ATS that these materials were in fact exported to Iraq during the period cited by the newspaper. The customs statistical division even indicates that other substances were at one time delivered to Iraq, but demurs regarding the quantities alleged in the newspaper—though without advancing its own figures.

The customs directorate refuses to comment on possible deliveries after 1987, when the two products came under the purview of the War Materiel Exports Act. The DMF also has no comment, pleading confidentiality of procedures.

Exports Increased

Switzerland's overall chemical exports to Iraq grew steadily through the 1980's. In 1987, some 1,300 tons of chemical products valued at 31 million francs [SF] were delivered to Iraq, whereas in 1989 the volume of those exports was 4,800 tons (SF95 million), according to the customs directorate.

By way of comparison, total Swiss exports of goods and services to Iraq came to SF311 million in 1989; machinery exports, amounting to SF189 million, made up the lion's share of the sales. Since imposition of the

economic embargo, Swiss exports to Iraq have virtually ceased. Chemical industry exports to Baghdad in 1990 were down 59 percent from the previous year.

Weapons Export Law Expansion Discussed

*91WC0069C Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE
in French 1 Feb 91 p 14*

[Unattributed ATS article: "Arms Sales: Exports Decline"]

[Text] Arms exports last year declined from 390 million to 329.7 million francs [SF], and in light of the Gulf war the Federal Council intends to slap controls on certain kinds of exports which in the past were unregulated....

Bern, 31 January (ATS)—Swiss exports of war materiel last year were valued at SF329.7 million, compared to SF390 million in 1989. Cyclic fluctuations were primarily responsible for the decline, according to the DMF [Federal Military Department]. But the Gulf crisis has brought other considerations to the fore, and the Federal Council intends to decide soon whether the field of application of the arms exports act needs to be expanded.

The military share of total Swiss merchandise exports was 0.37 percent last year, compared to 0.46 percent in 1989. According to military administration Deputy Director Francois Godet, the decline is due to increased competition from supplier countries, lower military budgets, and—since August—the cessation of exports to the Arabian peninsula.

In 1990 the biggest customers for Swiss arms were Canada (SF46.7 million), Austria (SF44 million), Germany (SF39.7 million), Great Britain (SF24.5 million), Singapore (SF20.3 million), Spain (SF18.9 million), Sweden (SF17.6 million), Netherlands (SF16.8 million), Italy (SF16.4 million) and the United States (SF15.9 million).

Turkey imported SF12.8 million worth of Swiss arms; it is now under a total embargo. Once war broke out, weapons involved in the conflict could not be exported to countries (such as the United States, Great Britain, and France) that belong to the anti-Iraq coalition.

Out of respect for client confidentiality, DMF does not disclose the types of arms delivered. But it is known that Switzerland primarily makes cannons, munitions, air defense guidance equipment, timing mechanisms, and miscellaneous accessories.

Chemicals

The law also regulates exports of personal weapons and explosives for civilian use. In 1987 the Federal Council extended the controls to substances that could be used for chemical weapons. Export of these substances is authorized for countries producing such things as fertilizers, pesticides, and plastics.

License Transfers

Under discussion now are possible revisions to the War Materiel Act to prohibit triangular transactions (materiel delivered by subsidiaries of Swiss firms but not transiting Swiss territory) and license transfers. The Federal Council is expected to decide in principle before summer.

Meanwhile, work proceeds on the drafting of a law that would require permits for the export of production facilities or technologies that could be used to manufacture chemical or biological weapons. According to Mr. Godet, the proposed law could be ready to send to the legislature by the end of the year.

Tighter Controls on Exports of Dual-Use Chemical Equipment

*91WC0069A Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE
in French 1 Feb 91 p 2*

[Interview with Francois Godet, head of the legal division of the Federal Military Department, by Jose Bessard; place and date not given: "Nonproliferation of 'ABC' [Atomic-Biologic-Chemical] Weapons: Bern Bolsters Its Legislative Arsenal"]

[Text] It is relatively easy to monitor the export of equipment that is exclusively military in nature. But diversion of chemicals to military purposes is difficult to control....

Bern—War materiel embodying the latest technology sometimes straddles the civilian and military domains. Though it is relatively easy to prevent the export into troubled regions of equipment used exclusively for military purposes, dual-use materials and products pose a real problem. The war in the Gulf underscores more than ever the need for clear national and international regulation of such commerce. Francois Godet, head of the legal division of the Federal Military Department (DMF), is taking steps to clear our legislative minefield.

[Bessard] The head of DMF, Kaspar Villiger, recently announced plans to strengthen the rules governing exports of high technology equipment that may have military application. The Swiss machine industry quickly indicated its willingness to cooperate in such a project, so long as the principles of transparency, practicability, and international consensus are respected. Where does that stand now?

[Godet] We must be careful to distinguish between two different things here. Mr. Villiger did not allude to any strengthening of the laws on exports of military materiel: He was talking about a new law. This new law, which might be called the "law on nonproliferation of ABC (Atomic-Biological-Chemical) weapons," is already being drawn up. And the two laws will complement each other.

Rabta

[Bessard] Is this initiative a result of the Gulf war and in particular the problems arising over chemical exports to Iraq?

[Godet] The DMF and the Federal Council did not wait until the Gulf war to begin tackling the job. Work was already under way in 1989. What started us thinking and convinced us of the need for a new law was the Rabta affair. (Editor's note: It was suspected that the manufacturing facility in Rabta, Libya, was capable of producing nonconventional weapons.) German firms were implicated in that affair and we knew the same thing could happen to industries in Switzerland. We therefore searched for some way to establish controls that could prevent countries trying to acquire biological or chemical weapons from purchasing equipment and technologies which were meant for civilian applications but which could also be used in the production of such weapons.

[Bessard] Is it really possible to establish and regularly update a list of products and suspected countries? Especially when the list would have to be accepted internationally?

[Godet] No international convention exists, at the moment. But efforts are being made, and concertation is taking place in several multinational fora. There is the "Australia Group," for example, which consists of about twenty industrialized countries; it issues directives to avoid sales to suspect countries of materials or technology that would help them build biological or chemical weapons.

[Bessard] Swiss chemical exports to Iraq have been growing since 1980. In 1989 the volume of those exports was 4,800 tons (95 million [Swiss] francs). They declined 59 percent in 1990, for obvious reasons. Is there a danger here?

[Godet] Since the embargo started, there have been no more exports, at least no legal exports. Nothing delivered before 7 August 1990 involved substances the exportation of which required a permit under the war materiel exports act.

[Bessard] But could some of those substances have been diverted from civilian use for military purposes?

[Godet] Normally not. Substances that are easily diverted require export permits. There are presently 17 substances that cannot be exported without a permit. The principle is this: Authorization must be requested for key precursors, in other words substances from which derivatives for military ends can be produced. Obviously, it is possible, using even more rudimentary substances, to manufacture the key precursors, which can then be used to make chemical weapons. But if we carry that argument to extremes, we would have to require permits even for the export of such simple substances as hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. That is why the line has been drawn at key precursors.

[Bessard] When could the new law go into effect?

[Godet] Drafting is well under way. In fact, a rough draft has already been submitted to nongovernmental experts in the chemical and machine industry for review. If all goes well, we think the Federal Council should be able to send a bill to parliament toward the end of the year.

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DATE FILMED

5 April 1991